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HIGH-TECH VIEW: THE USE OF
IMMERSIVE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS IN
JURY TRIALS
CARRIE LEONETTI*
JEREMY BAILENSON**
You‘ve got to be careful if you don‘t know where you‘re
going ‘cause you might not get there!
Yogi Berra1
I. INTRODUCTION
A trial, at its essence, is a process through which attorneys re-create the
image of a real-life event or circumstance and apply to the resulting factual
picture certain rules of law. Traditionally, during trial, abstract factual
material, such as material relating to state of mind, authority, responsibility, or
cause and effect, has been expressed verbally, through witness testimony,
rather than visually. Increasingly, however, as technology has progressed,
graphic images have played a greater role in communicating this information
that was traditionally imparted by words alone.2
Much has been written on a variety of legal issues stemming from the
advancement of virtual-reality (VR) technology,3 from the rights of players,

* Carrie Leonetti is an Assistant Professor at the University of Oregon School of Law. Her
research for this Article resulted in part from the generous funding of the Love, Moore, Banks, and
Grebe Endowment Fund. She wishes to thank John Mitchell of Seattle University School of Law,
Ryan Vacca of University of Denver School of Law, Judd Sneirson of University of Oregon School
of Law, Laura Appleman, David Friedman, Jeffrey Dobbins, Caroline Davidson, and Terrance
O‘Reilly of Willamette University College of Law, and Jeffrey Jones of Lewis and Clark Law School
for their thoughtful critique and suggestions. She also wishes to thank Krista Schuchard for her
diligent research assistance.
** Jeremy Bailenson is an Associate Professor of Communication at Stanford University.
1. THE YOGI BOOK: ―I REALLY DIDN‘T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID!‖ 102 (1998).
2. According to a University of California study, in 1999, 93% of all information generated was
generated in digital form on computers, rather than in other media, like paper. See In re BristolMyers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 440 n.2 (D.N.J. 2002).
3. See, e.g., BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW 4 (2008). ―Virtual reality‖ generally
refers to the interface between the user and the computer-based simulated environment. Id. The
term ―virtual reality‖ was coined by Jaron Lanier. See Jaron Lanier, Virtually There, SCI. AM., Apr.
2001, at 66, 68.
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users, and avatars in virtual worlds,4 end-user license agreements and terms of
service,5 virtual property and contract rights,6 intellectual property law and
virtual worlds,7 suing fictitious defendants in virtual worlds,8 virtual torts,9
virtual crimes,10 virtual privacy rights,11 the taxation of virtual currency,12 and
freedom of expression in virtual reality,13 to the reliability and authenticity of
evidence collected in a virtual world14 and the authenticity and admissibility
of digital evidence.15 This Article attempts to address a different question:
whether immersive-virtual-environment (IVE) technology16 could be designed
for and used during a jury trial.17
The benefit of using visual media in a jury trial is that, unlike words in
witness testimony, visual media are a richer means of communication, which
permit multiple coded items of information to be transmitted and absorbed at
one time and result in a direct image being transmitted through associations to
a jury.18 Visual media can furnish an avenue of continual communication by
4. DURANSKE, supra note 3, at 23–26.
5. Id. at 27–30.
6. Id. at 117–37.
7. Id. at 139–62.
8. Id. at 166–67.
9. Id. at 177–79.
10. Id. at 197–207.
11. Id. at 211–12.
12. Id. at 225–40.
13. See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in
Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141 (2008) (discussing the First Amendment implications of
virtual reality).
14. DURANSKE, supra note 3, at 52–54.
15. See GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE 14–15 (2008).
16. For a primer on the definition and types of IVE technology, see generally Jeremy N.
Bailenson et al., Courtroom Applications of Virtual Environments, Immersive Virtual Environments,
and Collaborative Virtual Environments, 28 LAW & POL‘Y 249 (2006).
17. Several commentators have also written about the admissibility of computer-generated
animations, which are, in a sense, a type of VR, but which employ fixed, rather than interactive,
immersive virtual environments. See, e.g., I. Neel Chatterjee, Admitting Computer Animations: More
Caution and New Approach Are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36 (1995); Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of
Computer-Generated Visual Evidence in Aviation Litigation: Interactive Video Comes To Court, 55
J. AIR L. & COM. 839 (1990); Dean A. Morande, A Class of Their Own: Model Procedural Rules and
Evidentiary Evaluation of Computer-Generated “Animations,” 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069 (2007).
18. See generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL (3d ed. 1997) (discussing jurors‘ beliefs on eyewitness testimony and factors
determining perception); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE
14–30 (1991) (documenting the ―Magic of the Mind‖); EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Loftus eds., 1984) (documenting how word choice and
the use of images effect how juries perceive information); Stephen M. Kosslyn et al., Visual Images
Preserve Metric Spatial Information: Evidence from Studies of Image Scanning, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 47, 57–59 (1978) (finding that human subjects
scanned a mental image of an object in their minds in the same manner and at roughly the same
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a party with the jury. Visual media are also infinitely faster, more efficient,
and more accurate than merely verbal presentations.19 Visual media can be
far more potent and persuasive than other types of evidence.20 Studies show
that jurors recollect approximately 85% of what they see but only 15% of
what they hear.21
VR technology, and more specifically IVE, is one such type of visual
media. An IVE is an artificial, interactive, computer-created scene or ―world‖
within which a user can immerse herself.22 IVEs combine high-resolution,
stereoscopic projection and three-dimensional computer graphics to create a
complete sense of presence in a virtual environment.23 IVEs consist of
immersion in an artificial environment in which the users feel just as
perceptually surrounded as they do in ―reality.‖24 IVEs produce a simulated

speed that they scanned the original visual object).
19. See Robert F. Seltzer, Evidence and Exhibits at Trial, in PRACTISING LAW INST.,
PREPARATION & TRIAL OF A TOXIC TORT CASE 1990, at 371, 373 (1990); Robert Seltzer, Effective
Communication: Seeing Is Believing, in PRACTISING LAW INST., PRODUCT LIABILITY OF
MANUFACTURERS 1988, at 597, 599 (1988).
20. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–86 (2007) (holding that a police officer did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when he deliberately rammed his patrol car into that of a fleeing
motorist, paralyzing him, during a high-speed chase, and finding that the officer‘s use of deadly force
was justified by the risk that the motorist‘s driving posed based largely on a video of the chase
recorded by a dashboard camera in the officer‘s car); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837,
842 (2009) (finding that video evidence creates a danger of ―decisionmaking hubris‖ in court
proceedings). But see Maryanne Garry & Matthew P. Gerrie, When Photographs Create False
Memories, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 321, 322–23 (2005) (arguing that text can be as,
if not more, powerful than images because text allows an individual to actively elaborate on details
about the words, while images permit an individual to passively absorb details).
Japanese roboticist Mori cautioned in a 1970 essay about the danger of creating human-like
robots. Jun‘ichiro Seyama & Ruth S. Nagayama, The Uncanny Valley: Effect of Realism on the
Impression of Artificial Human Faces, 16 PRESENCE: TELEOPERATORS & VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
337, 337 (2007). Mori created a graph that illustrates viewer responses to robots as they become
more human-looking. Id. at 338. His chart shows that, as robots become more human-looking, there
is a point at which ―they stop being likeable and instead become eerie, frightening, repulsive—
‗uncanny.‘‖ Tom Geller, Overcoming the Uncanny Valley, 28 IEEE COMPUTER GRAPHICS &
APPLICATIONS 11 (2008). At this point, the viewer‘s sensation becomes uneasy, and the human
response dips into ―the uncanny valley.‖ Id. For an in-depth and thorough analysis of the uncanny
valley, see Tom Geller‘s article on overcoming the valley. Id.; see also John Mangan, When Fantasy
Is
Just
Too
Close
for
Comfort,
Age
on
the
Web, June
10,
2007,
http://www.theage.com.au/news/entertainment/when-fantasy-is-just-too-close-for-comfort/2007/06/
09/1181089394400.html?page=fullpage (discussing the uncanny valley, animation, and film). Once
the robot‘s appearance becomes perfectly human-looking, the viewer‘s response increases and is no
longer in the uncanny valley. See Geller, supra, at 12.
21. See Seltzer, Evidence and Exhibits at Trial, supra note 19, at 373; Seltzer, Effective
Communication, supra note 19, at 599.
22. See Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 251–53.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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yet interactive reality in real time, which can support spatialized sound and
virtual touch.25 In an IVE, a participant‘s awareness of physical self is
diminished or lost by being surrounded in the engrossing total artificial
environment.26 Common examples of IVEs are certain computer games,
training programs such as flight and driving simulators, and immersive and
interactive art installations.27
One advantage of VR technology is that it enables a litigant, before the
jury, to simulate a particular experience, demonstrate and test subjective
perspective,28 and probe the structure and capacity of memory by
manipulating assumptions about variables like sequence and spatial
relationships.29 As has been previously documented, VR technology can be
designed for use in the courtroom, to re-create crime scenes, impeach the
testimony of unreliable witnesses, test assertions, and enhance a jury‘s
understanding of disputed events in computer-based simulated
environments.30 Because IVEs are digital, their data can be stored
indefinitely, making it possible for courts to archive VR models to create a
database of reusable locations and individuals.31
The power of an IVE, however, can be a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, an IVE could equip a jury with a better understanding of the material
facts at issue. On the other hand, the immersive, interactive, and fluid
character of an IVE gives rise to a risk of manipulation or undue influence
upon the jury, which may be swept up in the experiential nature of VR.32
Because VR models project an image of certainty and completeness through
25. See id. at 251.
26. See id. at 251–53.
27. See id. at 251–54.
28. See id. at 254–58.
29. See id. The user, in this case a juror, enters the IVE by using an ―avatar,‖ which is a visual
representation of herself that can interact with other users and the environment. DURANSKE, supra
note 3, at 7.
30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
31. See Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 251.
32. See id. at 263–64; cf. Lloyd P. Rieber, Animation, Incidental Learning, and Continuing
Motivation, 83 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 318, 326 (1991) (finding that individuals not only remember and
learn effectively from computer animation, they also assume information beyond what animations
purport to teach). However, it could result instead in the ―Christmas tree phenomenon,‖ i.e., jurors
will be so dazzled by the ―pretty lights‖ of a new visual technology that they will not adequately
consider the other evidence explaining or contradicting it. See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and
Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, in LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN
23, 42 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009).
Some commentators argue that depictions from certain angles can present a biased view of an
event because the visual images from multiple perspectives leave less time for analysis of each
individual event and present a quality of liveness that may not depict all relevant facets of the
accompanying testimony. See KENNETH B. HUGHES & BENJAMIN J. CANTOR, PHOTOGRAPHS IN
CIVIL LITIGATION 206 (1973).
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the clarity of their representations, they can create a distorted aura of
reliability for a jury.
The use of an IVE during a jury trial could have profound implications for
the manner in which lawyers present facts during trial. An IVE could be a
powerful alternative approach to recreating scenes (the configuration of
streets, driveways, buildings), episodes or events (appearances, sizes, and
shapes), and abstract factual material (trends, relationships) as visual images
rather than as strings of spoken or written text.33 For example, in an IVE,
jurors could view a crime scene or the scene of an accident from the
perspective of a witness or a party and manipulate the digital assets to test the
credibility of that perspective.34 By using an IVE during cross-examination,
an attorney could illustrate for the jury the limitations of a witness‘s capacity
to have observed the events about which he is testifying.
In general, trial courts enjoy a great deal of latitude in admitting
demonstrative evidence and controlling the form and manner of its
presentation,35 and the rules of evidence apply to VR evidence in the same
way that they apply to other types of evidence. It is the foundation for the
admission of VR evidence that may be different.36 There is little question that
a party could introduce a fixed VR simulation in evidence, as demonstrative
evidence or an illustrative aide,37 as long as such party could make the
33. Cognitive-science literature suggests that human beings have the ability to retain no more
than a few pieces of information in their short-term memories. See, e.g., George A. Miller, The
Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing
Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 86 (1956). The volume of information that an individual can
recall, therefore, is largely a function of the size and content of the individual pieces. See id.
34. Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 256–58. Such technology is already being developed.
See, e.g., Celeste Biever, Courtrooms Could Host Virtual Crime Scenes, NewScientist, Mar. 10,
2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7130&print=true (describing new software,
instant Scene Modeler, that can re-create an interactive, three-dimensional virtual crime scene from a
few hundred frames of a scene captured by a special video camera).
35. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (directing courts to exercise reasonable control over the mode of
presentation of evidence to make the presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth and to
avoid needless consumption of time); Meurling v. County Transp. Co., 230 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir.
1956); State v. Feaster, 716 A.2d 395, 436 (N.J. 1998).
36. See generally PAUL, supra note 15.
37. There are two primary conceptual classes of trial demonstrations: (1) demonstrative
materials that are admitted as substantive evidence to prove a fact in the case, and (2) illustrative aids
to testimony (―chalks‖). See Morande, supra note 17, at 1072–73. Demonstrative exhibits are
objects that directly convey relevant information from or of themselves—for example, a crime scene
photograph. Illustrative aids are visual representations of a witness‘s testimony, which do not
themselves provide bases for inferences, but merely facilitate the conveying of information by the
witness, who is the true source of the information—for example, a witness‘s illustration of the crime
scene drawn to assist the jury in following the witness‘s testimony about directions, distances, and
relative positions. See id. Demonstrative or illustrative evidence may be evidence that replicates the
original physical evidence, demonstrates some matter material to the case, or illustrates specific
aspects of an expert‘s opinion testimony. Id. Demonstrative evidence must satisfy specific tests of
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necessary foundational showing of authenticity, relevancy, and reliability
prior to its admission into evidence.38 The more interesting question, and the
subject of this Article, is whether the rules of evidence permit either a party or
the court itself to employ an IVE during a jury trial—in other words, to permit
the jurors to don VR gear and enter an immersive simulation of the scene of a
crime or accident.39

admissibility (such as relevancy and authenticity), but, once in evidence, it can be directly relied
upon by the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 104. To use a VR model as demonstrative evidence, a litigant
would have to establish its accuracy and trustworthiness. See United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d
889, 893 n.11 (9th Cir. 1969):
While . . . it is immaterial that the business record is maintained in a
computer rather than in company books, this is on the assumption that: (1) the
opposing party is given the same opportunity to inquire into the accuracy of the
computer and the input procedures used, as he would have to inquire into the
accuracy of written business records, and (2) the trial court, as in the case of
challenged business records, requires the party offering the computer
information to provide a foundation therefor sufficient to warrant a finding that
such information is trustworthy.
Id.; see also 14 AM. JUR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS § 17 (1977) (―The most common reason that courts
have rejected computerized evidence is that an insufficient foundation was laid to show the accuracy
and trustworthiness of the evidence.‖).
38. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Pa. 2006) (permitting the
Commonwealth to present a computer-generated animation as demonstrative evidence to illustrate
the expert opinions of its forensic pathologist and crime scene reconstructionist as to how a fatal
shooting allegedly occurred as long as the Commonwealth was able to properly authenticate its
animated exhibit as a fair and accurate depiction of its experts‘ reconstruction of the relevant crime
and the final version of the videotape animation did not include any inflammatory features that could
cause unfair prejudice).
39. There are two ways that a jury could enter an IVE simulating the scene—through a courtappointed expert or through an expert witness retained by one or more of the parties to the case to
construct an IVE and testify to sufficient foundation prior to ―publishing‖ the IVE to the jury. Trial
courts have the discretion to appoint their own, impartial experts. See FED. R. EVID. 614 (permitting
the court to call and interrogate witnesses); FED. R. EVID. 706 (codifying the court‘s inherent
authority to appoint expert witnesses of its own selection on its own motion); Reilly v. United States,
863 F.2d 149, 154–56 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing that trial courts have the inherent authority to
appoint technical advisors to assist them); Danville Tobacco Ass‘n v. Bryant-Buckner Assocs., 333
F.2d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 1964) (recognizing the inherent power of a trial court to appoint an expert of
its own choosing); Scott ex rel. Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1962) (same);
Commonwealth v. Correa, 648 A.2d 1199, 1201 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that the trial court
had inherent authority to appoint an expert); 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 367 (2d ed. 1994); CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE STANDARDS § 6
(2007) (recognizing that trial judges have the inherent authority to appoint expert technical advisors
and witnesses) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. Provisions governing the appointment of court
experts comparable to those contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence exist in most states. See,
e.g., PA. R. EVID. 614 (permitting the court to call and interrogate witnesses); PA. R. EVID. 706
(delineating the procedure that a court must follow if it appoints an expert witness). If the court
appoints its own VR expert, it could permit the parties to provide information to its VR expert for use
in constructing the IVE. See ABA STANDARDS, supra, § 6(d) (suggesting guidelines for
communication between parties and a court-appointed expert).
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The immersive nature of IVEs can seem foreign in the context of the
American adversary judicial system. Nonetheless, the use of an IVE during
trial is not without precedent; in fact, it is probably inevitable. IVEs fit within
the traditional framework of jury trials in two primary and interrelated ways:
first, as the next step in technological development of visual media that began
with drawings and photographs and has progressed to videotape and computer
animations and simulations, and second, as an improved, but functional
equivalent, of a jury scene-viewing.
This Article makes both empirical and normative claims about the
admissibility of IVE evidence during a jury trial. The empirical claim is that
IVE evidence will inevitably enter the American courtroom; the normative
one is that this inevitable entrance is a positive development for the jury‘s
search for truth. To the extent that courts have been hesitant to admit VR
evidence in jury trials, such hesitance is likely the result of institutional
resistance to new technology.40
Parts II, III, and IV of this Article explore concerns relating to the
accuracy, reliability, and authenticity of, and potential for distortion within,
IVEs under the substantial-similarity test that most courts employ in
determining whether demonstrative evidence is unduly prejudicial or
misleading, the best evidence rule as it relates to digital re-creations of reallife objects, and the traditional methods of authentication, respectively.
Part V explores the foundational requirements for expert testimony and
scientific evidence. It argues that, while the digital projections created by an
IVE are not perfectly realistic representations of the objects that they seek to
re-create, nonetheless, an IVE can be a fair and accurate representation of the
scene that it represents, as long as an expert witness could lay the appropriate
foundation to show that the IVE was reliable and accurate enough that its
probative value would outweigh its inherent risks of distortion. It argues that
VR experts need to validate scientifically the consistency and reproducibility
of IVE methodology and results and that attorneys seeking to use IVEs during
trial must work to fit them within the strictures of the rules of evidence.
Specifically, this Part argues that a proponent of expert testimony based upon
VR technology, particularly a proponent wanting the jury to enter an IVE,
would need to lay the necessary foundation to establish the following: (1) the
IVE was relevant to a material dispute in the case (e.g., the vantage point of
an eyewitness or a party); (2) the field of IVE generally, and the expert
witness‘s IVE protocols in particular, were generally accepted among the
relevant scientific community, presumably computer experts; (3) the expert
40. See H.D. Wendorf, Some Views on Jury Views, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 379, 385–87 (1963)
(describing the ―legalistic inertia‖ and ―anti-newness‖ that led courts in Texas to resist the institution
of the jury view).
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witness could demonstrate an ability to produce reliable and accurate IVEs
without significant distortion; and (4) the IVE protocols and their accuracy
had been scientifically validated and subjected to peer review, and there was
some meaningful way to define and measure error within the IVEs created.
Part VI argues that permitting a jury to enter and interact within an IVE is
not without precedent in the American legal system. It points out that most
American jurisdictions have historically permitted juries to visit the scene of a
crime or accident in the middle of trial as part of their factual inquiry, even
though the scene that the jury views is no longer in the same state that it was
in at the time of the events in question, as long as the scene remains in a
substantially similar state as at the time of the alleged crime or accident. This
Part notes that, despite clear distortions in the scenes of crimes and accidents
that occur between the events at issue and the trial, the common law
recognizes that the probative value of an on-site view of the scene outweighs
the potential undue prejudice or jury confusion that may result from an
imperfect replication of the scene and leaves to argument by the parties the
weight that the jury should place on the imperfections.
Part IV also argues that an IVE created to simulate the scene of a crime or
accident so that the jury could virtually view it could be a more accurate way
to reconstruct the scene than a live jury viewing, since the IVE could simulate
the time of day and presence of physical evidence in a way that the actual
scene, stripped of much of its material evidence prior to jury viewing, could
not. This Part analogizes the use of an IVE to reconstruct a crime scene to the
introduction of crime scene photographs into evidence and argues that, if an
IVE can re-create a scene that is more accurate than photographs taken at a
later time or under different circumstances than those present at the time of
the events in question, such evidence is more helpful to a jury than
photographic evidence or a live viewing of the scene. It argues that there is
no reason why IVE technology should be subjected to any different or more
strenuous thresholds for admissibility than any other representational medium.
Part VII discusses the use of expert witnesses and IVEs to reconstruct
crime scenes during criminal trials. It argues that, in the context of a criminal
case, there are two additional advantages that an IVE re-creation of a crime
scene would have over an actual jury viewing or other representational
evidence: (1) an IVE could be controlled in a way that could eliminate certain
Federal Rule of Evidence (Rule) 403 concerns without diminishing the
probative value of the evidence, and (2) the use of an IVE representing the
events in question could provide a vehicle for a criminal defendant to
introduce evidence of, and permit the jury to test, her version of events
without having to waive her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.
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II. RULE 403 AND THE SUBSTANTIAL-SIMILARITY TEST
Digital projections in an IVE are not perfectly realistic representations of
the objects and events that they seek to re-create.41 VR models are created
based upon witnesses‘ observations of what happened, and those baseline
assumptions within the model may or may not be made explicit.42 Two
different VR models built upon two different sets of assumptions about a
material fact can produce two different outcomes.43 VR models can also
permit people to view and navigate a scene in ways not possible in the
physical world—for example, by ―teleporting,‖ flying, or walking through
walls.44
One concern with using an IVE with a jury would be whether the IVE
would be misinterpreted by, or inappropriately persuasive to, lay jurors. This
concern arises for at least two reasons. First, VR models can look deceptively
like photographs of the scenes that they depict. Media theorists refer to this
phenomenon as the appeal of transparency.45
Cognitive and social
psychologists refer to it as naive realism: the compelling impression that one
has unmediated access to objective reality.46 IVEs may be convincing as
evidence because of their ability to induce epistemic confusion—they suggest
that the jury is looking directly at the scene of the crime or accident. In other
words, IVEs have been remediated to a familiar medium (photography) that
jurors are already accustomed to seeing through directly to reality.
Second, IVEs could be uniquely persuasive to jurors because of their
status as scientific models. An IVE representing the scene of a crime or
accident appears as a mechanized, computerized, and, therefore, objective

41. Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 262. Of course, photographs, long admitted as accurate
representations of the objects whose image they capture, are not perfect representations of those
images either. Id. at 259.
42. Id. at 258. There are two philosophies on building IVE models. The first, the ―top-down‖
approach, is to take multiple photographs of a scene from different angles and use software that can
―stitch‖ them together to provide a seamless representation of the scene and calculate depth from
algorithms that take into account the distances between objects seen from different angles. The
second, the ―bottom-up‖ approach, is to build each object in the virtual scene individually—for
example, the car, the tire, the floor of the alley, each bystander.
43. Sometimes it may not be possible to have ground truth of what a scene looked like—for
example, if lighting, weather, or traffic patterns are different from day to day.
44. There are ways to ―lock‖ these features and ensure that individuals immersed in the IVE do
not deviate from a human perspective by using processes like collision detection (which prohibits
virtual individuals in an IVE from walking through physical objects). See Bailenson et al., supra
note 16, at 251 (stating that an IVE can track a person‘s actual movements).
45. See JAY DAVID BOLTER & RICHARD GRUSIN, REMEDIATION: UNDERSTANDING NEW
MEDIA (1999).
46. See Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive
Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404
(1995).
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(i.e., highly reliable) segment of scientific knowledge. In addition, an IVE is
a mathematized entity, the visual representation of a series of computerized
measurements and computations. The impact of IVEs derives, therefore, from
IVEs‘ similarity to other symbols of scientific truth in society at large.
Another concern with using an IVE with a jury would be whether the
medium itself would unfairly distort the message that the witnesses were
endeavoring to communicate, by engendering inferences that were not
supported by witness testimony because of the assumptions on which the VR
models were based. IVE technology, in particular, has the innate power to
appeal to a jury‘s emotional and subconscious processes because of its ability
to use symbolic patterns that convey powerfully ingrained psychological
messages that are altogether different from the purported purpose of the aid.
Psychologists have also documented phenomena such as virtual-source
monitoring confusion, in which virtual memories become real.47 A recent
study has shown, for example, that children form false memories very quickly
in VR worlds.48
These concerns with persuasive distortion increase with the sophistication
of the medium in question, particularly in a computerized medium such as
IVE technology, because of the increased probability that a jury would lend
more credibility to an impressive IVE because of VR‘s artificial sensation of
precision and certainty—for example, by assuming that an IVE was to scale
when it was not49 or drawing conclusions based upon the positioning, path,
speed, and reaction times of the objects portrayed.50 Because of these risks of
unfairness and inaccuracy, the most significant evidentiary barrier to the use
of an IVE during a jury trial would be the overarching dictate of Rule 403,51
and the substantial-similarity requirement.52

47. See Hunter G. Hoffman et al., Virtual Reality Monitoring: Phenomenal Characteristics of
Real, Virtual, and False Memories, 4 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 565, 566 (2001).
48. See generally Kathryn Y. Segovia & Jeremy N. Bailenson, Virtually True: Children’s
Acquisition of False Memories in Virtual Reality, 12 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 371 (2009), available at
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a917321633~db=all~jumptype=rss.
49. Much has been written in the VR field on the issue of ―distance perception‖—the concept
that individuals consistently misperceive distances even when they are modeled to scale. See
generally EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966). Because of this chronic
misperception, some VR experts advocate the need to make virtual distances greater than real
distances in order for VR users to accurately perceive the real distances psychologically. See, e.g.,
Bly v. Arkansas, 593 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1980).
50. But see Bly, 593 S.W.2d at 456 (finding no error in the admission into evidence of a crime
scene investigator‘s diagrams and sketches of the scene, even though they were not drawn to scale,
reasoning that ―[o]bviously, this was of assistance to the witnesses in offering their testimony and
probably aided the jury in understanding what the witness was saying‖) (citations omitted).
51. Rule 403 states: ―Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
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The case of Cartier v. Jackson53 exemplifies the concerns that courts often
have with demonstrative exhibits that are imperfect representations of
material facts. Cartier was a singer-songwriter who alleged that Michael
Jackson‘s song ―Dangerous‖ infringed on the copyright of her earlier song by
the same name.54 Cartier retained a recording engineer to produce
comparison tapes, which extracted portions from each version of
―Dangerous.‖55 The tempo of the excerpts from Jackson‘s version of the song
was slowed on the comparison tapes, and the key of the excerpts was changed
to accommodate the slowing.56 The tape also looped back on themselves
musical phrases that were not repeated in the original song and spliced
together parts of the choruses that were not adjacent in the originals.57
Without citing a specific rule of evidence, the district court excluded Cartier‘s
evidence, concluding that the comparison tapes did not ―fairly and accurately
depict[] the original.‖58 Upholding the exclusion of the evidence on appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted the
district court‘s ruling as a finding that the recordings could have misled the
jury under Rule 403 and found that such ruling was not an abuse of discretion
because ―the changes made to the songs in these recordings were so
significant that the tapes no longer represented the songs in question in this
case.‖59

evidence.‖ FED. R. EVID. 403. In any trial, the trial court retains an inherent authority to protect the
fairness of the proceedings by preventing unfair prejudice from potentially extraneous influences,
particularly under Rule 403, which comprises the power to preclude the presentation of a
demonstrative exhibit or illustrative aid that would create a significant risk of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or the needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Most states have evidentiary rules functionally indistinguishable
from the federal rule. See, e.g., MD. R. EVID. 5-403; PA. R. EVID. 403; S.C. R. EVID. 403; FLA. STAT.
§ 90.403 (2009); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 403 (2010).
The court could also exclude an IVE due to related concerns pursuant to Rule 611 (authorizing
the court to ―exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment‖).
52. See, e.g., Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 974–75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991) (rejecting a video simulation of a high-speed rear-end automobile collision when the tests
were not similar enough because there were too many variables between the tests and the evidence
was presented to render the tests probative on any point raised).
53. 59 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1995).
54. Id. at 1047.
55. Id. at 1049.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.

1084

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:1073

Most courts deal with the question of fair representation by employing
some variation of this substantial-similarity test, which requires that
demonstrative exhibits share substantial enough similarity with the items that
they seek to represent that they constitute fair and accurate representations of
those items.60 That is what happened in the high-profile case of Harris v.
Texas.61 Harris discovered that her husband was having an affair when a
private investigator notified her that her husband had checked into a hotel
with another woman.62 Shortly thereafter, Harris and her stepdaughter,
Lindsey, drove to the hotel, where they found and vandalized the woman‘s
car.63 Harris and Lindsey called Harris‘s husband on his cellular telephone
and told him that one of his other children was ill.64 When her husband and
the other woman left the hotel, Harris struck her husband with her car,
throwing his body approximately sixty-five feet.65 When he landed, she
circled her car around in the parking lot and ran over him again, killing him. 66
The entire incident was caught on tape by the private investigator that Harris
had hired to follow her husband.67
At Harris‘s ensuing murder trial, the crucial disputed issue was how many
times Harris had run over her husband.68 The private investigator‘s video was
of poor quality.69 The State of Texas called six eyewitnesses who testified
that she had driven over her husband‘s body multiple times while circling in
the parking lot.70 The defense proffered a VR re-creation of Harris‘s route in
the parking lot, made by an expert accident reconstructionist using computer
animation, simulation, scene measurements, and the videotape taken by the
private investigator.71 The tape supported the reconstructionist‘s theory that,
given the final resting place of the body and the location of a blood stain next
to it, Harris ran over her husband only once by demonstrating that Harris‘s car
never drove over the blood stain.72 The tape did not use a model or dummy to

60. See, e.g., Ramseyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 417 F.2d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 1969); Gillam v. J.C.
Penney Co., 341 F.2d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 1965); Larson v. Meyer, 161 N.W.2d 165, 167–68 (N.D.
1968); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 13 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Neb. 1944).
61. 152 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App. 2004).
62. Id. at 788–89.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 789.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 789–90.
69. Id. at 789.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 790.
72. Id. at 790, 793.
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represent the body and had an ―X‖ to indicate the location of the critical blood
stain.73
The trial court recognized the validity of the field of accident
reconstruction and the expert‘s qualifications and found that the proffered VR
exhibit was relevant to the case; the court, however, excluded the video due to
concerns with the potential of the inaccurate format of the evidence to mislead
and confuse the jury, particularly the omission of a body near the blood stain,
and found that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value
of the exhibit.74 The trial court permitted Harris to introduce a substantial
number of charts and drawings illustrating the defense expert‘s opinion
testimony, including a poster showing the movement of Harris‘s car as it
circled in the parking lot.75 The jury found Harris guilty of murder, with a
special finding that she caused her husband‘s death in the heat of passion
upon adequate provocation.76 The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court‘s exclusion of the VR evidence on the ground that whether the VR
simulation would have been misleading and confusing to the jury fell within
the zone of reasonable disagreement and did not constitutionally impair
Harris‘s opportunity to present a complete defense, requiring the court to
leave its admission or exclusion committed to the trial court‘s discretion.77
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court reached a
similar conclusion in Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Associates,78 a case
involving the Rodds‘ use of super-magnified computer images of
mammograms in a medical malpractice, wrongful death action. To assist the
jury in explaining the appearance of a malignancy in a mammogram and to
simulate for the jury what the defendants, who treated the decedent, Maria
Rodd, saw when they viewed her mammogram films using a magnifying lens,
the Rodds‘ attorney digitally scanned selected portions of Rodd‘s
mammograms into a computer to produce images that were magnified by
anywhere between 30 and 150 times the size of the X-rays, which were then
projected onto a six-foot-by-eight-foot screen for the jury to view.79 The
Rodds‘ expert testified that ―viewing the computerized images on the large
screen from the perspective of the jury was similar to a radiologist viewing a
mammogram film on a light box from close observation using a four-times
magnifying glass,‖ although he conceded that he examined mammograms

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 790.
Id. at 790, 792–23; see also TEX. R. EVID. 403.
Harris, 152 S.W.2d at 794.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 794.
860 A.2d 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 1006.
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with a handheld magnifying glass and did not project them to the size of the
demonstrative exhibits offered into evidence.80
The defense objected to the use of the super-magnified computer images,
in part because of the potential for distortion and confusion engendered by use
of the super-magnified images—specifically, that the Rodds ―may have
created the appearance that the cluster was focal‖ by compressing the image
and ―showing only a selective cluster rather than an all-inclusive picture of the
calcifications.‖81 The trial judge permitted the Rodds to use the large-screen
computer projections, over the defense‘s objection, including in crossexamination of the defense expert, because such projections would aid the
jury.82
On appeal, the Appellate Division held that the computer imagery
displayed to the jury ―was unduly influential, potentially confusing,
susceptible of being accepted as substantive evidence, and clearly capable of
producing an unjust result,‖ thus, warranting a new trial.83 The court reasoned
that the use of computerized images to demonstrate that a cancerous cluster
existed and was clearly visible on the mammogram films had the potential to
confuse the jurors and distract them from assessing the defendants‘ action
under the correct standard of care, which was to view the mammogram with a
2.5-power magnifying lens.84 The court explained that the demonstration did
more than simply illustrate the Rodds‘ expert‘s testimony, but rather provided
the jury with ―testimonial evidence—independent proof‖ of what could and
should have been seen by the defendants using the standard magnifying
glass.85
In the case of IVEs, their probative value outweighs their epistemic
pitfalls. Even though they may be unduly or improperly persuasive for the
reasons discussed supra, the dangers that they may pose to a jury‘s decision
making do not compel their per se exclusion from the courtroom. Reliable
jury decision making about questions to which IVEs are relevant is best
pursued not by excluding IVEs, but rather by admitting them and allowing
expert witnesses and lawyers to educate jurors about computer scientists‘
construction and interpretation of their content.
Courts routinely admit all manners of photographs, conventional, digital,86
and digitally enhanced,87 yet all photographs are virtual environments of sorts.
80. Id. at 1006–07.
81. Id. at 1007.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1012.
84. Id. at 1011.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 50-2209.01(b) (2010) (―Recorded images taken by an automated
traffic enforcement system are prima facie evidence of an infraction and may be submitted without
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Conventional photographs are created when a camera focuses light onto a
piece of film using mechanical shutters, creating a negative, which is then
developed into a print with chemicals.88 When an individual uses a camera to
take a photograph, she makes all kinds of judgments about lighting, shooting
angle, and field of view—judgments that involve inherent distortions.89
Digital photographs are created when ―[a] digital camera focuses the light
onto a semiconductor device that records the information [in binary code (a
series of ones and zeros)], which can be read and interpreted by a
computer.‖90 Once in a digital format, all forms of information—sound,
graphics, text, and video—can be stored, accessed, retrieved, manipulated,
organized, and sent over the Internet at any time from any location.91 From
the binary code of a digital photograph, a computer creates pixels (the tiny
colored dots that make up the larger images).92 Because the pixels, which are
sets of bits that represent a graphic image, can be manipulated, larger images
can be easily altered.93 Digitally enhanced photographs are made by
―manipulating the pixels in [a] picture to provide greater clarity.‖94 The issue
authentication.‖).
87. See, e.g., State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 943 (Conn. 2004) (admitting enhanced digital
photographs of bite marks).
88. PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 357 (2d ed. 2008).
89. See Tal Golan, Visual Images in the Courtroom: A Historical Perspective, 14 PARALLAX
77, 78 (2008). Initially, courts and commentators were resistant to the admission of photographic
evidence because of the unique persuasive power of its reality and immediacy. See id. at 79;
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 41–42 (1998).
90. RICE, supra note 88, at 357.
91. See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PRIMER FOR LEGAL
PROFESSIONALS § 1.2(A) (2009).
92. RICE, supra note 88, at 357.
93. Id.; Michael Cherry, Reasons to Challenge Digital Evidence and Electronic Photography,
27 CHAMPION 42, 42–43 (2003); Jill Witkowski, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New
Foundation Requirements for the Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 267,
271 (2002) (―Digital images are easier to manipulate than traditional photographs and digital
manipulation is more difficult to detect.‖).
As one commentator explains:
[S]hadows could be added to adjacent buildings to make the time of the
photograph and the ambient light appear to be different from that which existed
when the accident or crime happened; a drawn gun could be placed in the hands
of a police officer; an identifying badge could be added to a hat.
RICE, supra note 88, at 358.
Conventional photography can also manipulate a print from a negative, . . .
[and c]onventional printing can change appearance by increasing or decreasing
contrast, focus, or size. . . . [B]ut the possibilities are miniscule compared to the
enhancement options available through digital technology.
Id. at 362.
94. Id. at 305. Computer alteration of digital photographs can range from enhancement (e.g.,
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of whether an alteration is an enhancement or a distortion also arises with
videotapes.95
Nonetheless, black-and-white, color, digital, and video
photographs have all been ―successfully integrated into the evidentiary terrain
under the illustrative evidence doctrine to be treated merely as graphic
expression of human testimony.‖96
Courts also routinely admit all kinds of other visual images produced
using more sophisticated technologies: X-rays, computer-generated
animations and simulations,97 digitally enhanced images of latent fingerprints
or DNA profiles, and medical-imaging technologies, such as computed
tomography (CT scans), positron emission tomography (PET scans), singlephoton-emission computed tomography (SPECT scans), and magnetic
resonance imaging (MRIs).98
Nonetheless, the potential for fraud, even hard-to-detect fraud, does not
typically render other forms of visual-image evidence inadmissible.99 Rather,
established evidentiary principles are applied to test the accuracy, reliability,
and authenticity of such articles on a case-by-case basis.100 To the extent that
an IVE alters, or varies with, any of the material attributes of the scene, the
trial court will merely have to appraise how those variations impact the
improving sharpness, contrast, and visibility and isolating patterns and colors) to restoration (adding
details missing from a photograph based upon a preexisting conception of what the end result should
look like) to fraudulent manipulation (transfiguring the image originally recorded by the camera). Id.
at 362; State v. Hayden, 950 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
95. Nooner v. State, 907 S.W.2d 677, 686 (Fla. 1995) (admitting digital photographs of a
suspect that had been copied from a videotape and enhanced because the jury had the opportunity to
view the original videotape along with the photographs and identify for itself any distortion within
the photographs); Dolan v. State, 743 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); RICE, supra note
88, at 362.
96. Golan, supra note 89, at 86.
97. The first major case concerning the admissibility of a computer simulation was Perma
Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding the admission of expert
testimony based on computer simulations).
98. Golan, supra note 89, at 77; see also Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973–74
(8th Cir. 1995) (allowing into evidence PET and MRI scans); Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d
552, 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing trial court‘s exclusion of SPECT evidence); Green v.
K-Mart Corp., 01-675, pp. 16–24 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/18/03); 849 So. 2d 814, 826–30 (upholding the
admission of PET-based testimony to diagnose prior brain trauma).
99. See, e.g., Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 478 (N.Y. 1881) (asserting that photographs were
not substantively different from the more traditional forms of visual evidence that courts had
admitted for centuries).
100. United States v. Salcido, 506 F.3d 729, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
government is not required to introduce an expert to authenticate child pornography images); United
States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a claim that the government must
present extrinsic evidence to prove the reality of children depicted in images purported to be child
pornography); United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that extrinsic
evidence was not required to prove the reality of children depicted in child-pornography images);
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003) (―Juries are still capable of
distinguishing between real and virtual images . . . .‖).
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balance between the probative value of the IVE and its potential to mislead,
confuse, or create unfair prejudice under Rule 403, like with any other
proffered exhibit.101 Concerns with potential distortion should normally be
entrusted to the jury as a factor in its resolution of the weight to be given such
evidence.102
IVEs may produce unsanctioned meanings in jurors‘ minds, but all images
displayed in court are capable of doing this. Implicit meanings are ingrained
in all visual representations.103 In any photograph, there is decreased
information when compared to the original image, such as fewer pixels and
the conversion of three-dimensional objects into two-dimensional images,
which depend upon numerous assumptions about perspectives, distance, and
relationships between objects.104 ―[T]he lens used on [any] camera can distort
the apparent distance and relationship of things to one another.‖105
Nonetheless, the rules of evidence do not exclude all photographic
images. Instead, because the law of evidence recognizes that all visual
representations may prompt jurors to find facts or reach judgments for
improper reasons, it subjects them (as it does all other evidence) to the
balancing test of Rule 403.106 Some visual representations survive this
inquiry; others do not.107 There is no rationale for treating IVEs specially.
IVEs may, on balance, decrease rather than increase epistemic biases.
Photographs lose the z axis (depth), while IVEs preserve it. Because IVEs
can capture three-dimensional information about depth and portray images
from multiple angles and distances, they are generally a more accurate
representation than two-dimensional photographs.108 Although excluding
IVEs may preclude some kinds of distortion, admitting IVEs may rectify other
kinds. If an IVE can re-create a scene that is more accurate than photographs
taken at a later time or under different circumstances than those present at the

101. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City S. R.R. Co., 02-1505, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/28/03); 846
So. 2d 980, 983 (holding that a computer-generated animation of the scene of a railroad crossing was
inadmissible because it was based upon inaccurate facts); State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 295
(Minn. 2002) (holding that it was error to admit a computer-generated animation that included the
facial expressions of the victim because the facial expressions had no probative value and were
unfairly prejudicial).
102. See FED. R. EVID. 104(e).
103. See Richard K. Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication
Technologies Are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 227, 245 (2006).
104. See RICE, supra note 88, at 357–58, 362.
105. Id. at 366 n.55.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 259.
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time of the events in question, then such evidence is more helpful to a jury
than photographic evidence or a live viewing of the scene.109
The case of Colley v. Standard Oil Co.,110 which addressed the
admissibility of photographs that a party had altered to make them better
represent the scene at the time of the events in question, illustrates this point.
Colley filed a wrongful death action seeking damages for the death of her
husband, a train engineer who died from injuries received when his train
collided with a Standard Oil truck at a grade crossing.111 At trial, over
Colley‘s objection, the court permitted Standard Oil to admit photographs of
the view to the north of the crossing, the direction in which the truck driver
had been looking as he approached.112 The photographs ―had been altered
artificially‖ by eliminating an area of the photograph where a store building
had allegedly been obstructing the truck driver‘s view of approaching
traffic.113 The reason for the alteration was that, between the time of the
collision and the time of the trial, the building in question had burned down.114
Colley objected to the admission of the photographs on the ground that ―they
did not constitute a true representation of the scene.‖115
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
rejected Colley‘s objection, explaining:
Here it was only an effort to make the photographs show, as
nearly as was possible after the fire, what view of oncoming
cars (or trains) there was in that particular direction at the
time of the accident. An unaltered photograph would not
have shown this and would probably have created a much
109. Courts have held that the availability of audiovisual depictions of the scene is pertinent to
the resolution of whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a request for live scene view.
See, e.g., United States v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1997) (―A court generally acts
within [its discretion to permit a view] when there is sufficient evidence describing the scene in the
form of testimony, diagrams, or photographs.‖); United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1305
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding that the district court‘s decision to deny Martinez‘s request for a jury
viewing of the crime scene was ―especially‖ reasonable because Martinez was afforded, but declined,
the court‘s invitation to offer into evidence a defense-created videotape of the exterior and interior of
the scene); United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that the use of
photographic exhibits to illustrate the relevant features of the scene rendered a live jury view
―cumulative, if not repetitive‖ and unduly time-consuming); United States v. Gallagher, 620 F.2d
797, 801 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Gallagher‘s request that the jury be permitted to view the truck that he used to escape from the
penitentiary because numerous photographs of the truck and its interior were admitted into evidence,
which were adequate to show the disputed material facts relating to the truck).
110. 157 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1946).
111. Id. at 1008.
112. Id. at 1008–09.
113. Id. at 1008.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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more erroneous impression of the scene than could have been
obtained from these altered photographs. . . . The
assumptions upon which this contention [that the blanked-out
area in the photographs was mere theory and not accurate] is
based are not borne out in the light of the detailed testimony
of the photographer . . . .116
As the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota explained
in its rationale for admitting digitally enhanced photographs:
[A]djustments to brightness or contrast, or enlargement of the
image, while arguably a manipulation, are in fact no more
manipulative than the recording process itself. The image is
black and white; the world is not. In the non-digital world, a
camera‘s lens, its aperture, shutter speed, length of exposure,
film grain, and development process—all affect the image.
Each of these is entirely unremarkable so long as the ―image‖
remains an accurate recording of that which occurred before
the camera. If a photographic negative were magnified by
lens, and an enlarged image resulted, no one would question
the larger picture. Similarly, in the event of a tape recording,
no one would comment if the volume were increased to make
a recorded conversation more easily heard—again, so long as
the volume-increased words were accurately recorded by the
recording medium.117
Because of the concerns with distortion and manipulation of IVE
evidence, courts should ensure that there are rigorous mechanisms for an
opposing party to discover and challenge IVE evidence. The rules of criminal
procedure provide for pretrial reciprocal discovery of documents and objects
(including photographs and ―tangible objects‖), the results and reports of
scientific tests and experiments, and a summary of expert testimony that either
party intends to use in its case in chief.118 The rules of civil procedure are
broader and require pretrial reciprocal discovery of data compilations and
tangible things, including electronically stored information (ESI), that either
party may use to support its claims or defenses and comprehensive reports
detailing testimony of any expert that either party may call as a witness.119
116. Id. at 1009–10.
117. United States v. Seifert, 351 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 (D. Minn. 2005).
118. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)–(b).
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). In 2006, Rule 34 was specifically amended to encompass the
discovery of ESI. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). The new rule was intended to ―cover all current types
of computer-based information‖ and to be ―flexible enough to encompass future changes and
developments.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee‘s notes. Amended Rule 34(a) establishes
the right of a party to ―test‖ or ―sample‖ ESI, rather than merely inspect or copy it.
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). Parties to civil proceedings may also serve upon one another written
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While Rule 403 does not expressly list surprise as a ground for exclusion of
otherwise probative evidence, courts have found that advance notice (or lack
thereof) was an element in deciding whether admission of a proffered exhibit
would result in unfair prejudice.120 In both criminal and civil cases, a court
has the discretion to sanction any party who fails to fulfill these discovery
requirements, including by compelling disclosure and prohibiting the party
from introducing the undisclosed item into evidence.121 Taken together, these
discovery mechanisms should enable a party to detect distortions in another
party‘s (or the court‘s) IVE evidence and to challenge it, under the extant
rules of evidence, if it is not fair and accurate.122
III. BEST EVIDENCE
Because an IVE is largely a re-creation of physical evidence based upon
out-of-court investigation, the use of IVE technology in the courtroom could
also give rise to best evidence rule concerns.123 The Seiler v. Lucasfilm,
Ltd.124 case provides an example. Seiler was a graphic artist who claimed that
the Imperial Walkers in the film The Empire Strikes Back infringed his
copyright on an earlier invention, the ―Garthian Striders.‖125 At a pretrial
evidentiary hearing, Seiler could not produce any originals of the Striders that
existed prior to the film.126 Instead, he sought to rely upon ―reconstructions‖
of the original works that he had deposited with the United States Copyright
Office one year after the release of The Empire Strikes Back.127 The district
court ruled that the best evidence rule prevented Seiler from introducing

interrogatories, see FED. R. CIV. P. 33, requests for production of documents (including drawings,
graphs, charts, photographs, and other data compilations), see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a), and admissions
to the truth of any relevant matters (including the authenticity of computer data and other electronic
information), see FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a). The parties may also compel production of ESI in the
possession of third parties by use of subpoenas. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)–(c), 45(a).
120. See, e.g., Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1984).
121. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), (c)(1).
122. See RICE, supra note 88, at 399 (arguing that expanded pretrial discovery can justify a
lesser foundation for authenticity).
123. See FED. R. EVID. 1002 (requiring an original document to prove the contents of a writing,
recording, or photograph). But see Commonwealth v. Leneski, 846 N.E.2d 1195, 1198–99 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2006) (―Videotapes, like photographs, are not subject to the best evidence rule. . . . As with
videotapes, we think that digital image evidence is not subject to the best evidence rule, as such
images are not writings. . .‖) (citation omitted). Some commentators have noted the nonsensical
nature of a discussion of an ―original record‖ in the context of digital evidence. See, e.g., PAUL,
supra note 15, at 13–14; RICE, supra note 88, at 304.
124. 808 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 1317.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1318.
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secondary evidence of the Striders.128 As a result, Seiler had no admissible
evidence, and the court granted summary judgment to Lucasfilm.129
On appeal, Seiler contended, inter alia, that the best evidence rule did not
apply to his works because the rule embraced only the written word.130 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Seiler‘s
contention, holding that his reconstructions were ―writings‖ within the
meaning of Rule 1001 because they consisted of the ―equivalent‖ of ―letters,
words, or numbers.‖131 The court reasoned: ―Seiler‘s drawings are objective
manifestations of the creative mind.‖132 The court explained:
The facts of this case implicate the very concerns that
justify the best evidence rule. Seiler alleges infringement by
The Empire Strikes Back, but he can produce no documentary
evidence of any originals existing before the release of the
movie. His secondary evidence does not consist of true
copies or exact duplicates but of ―reconstructions‖ made after
The Empire Strikes Back. In short, Seiler claims that the
movie infringed his originals, yet he has no proof of those
originals.
The dangers of fraud in this situation are clear. The rule
would ensure that proof of the infringement claim consists of
the works alleged to be infringed.
Otherwise,
―reconstructions‖ which might have no resemblance to the
purported original would suffice as proof for infringement of
the original. Furthermore, application of the rule here defers
to the rule‘s special concern for the contents of writings.
Seiler‘s claim depends on the content of the originals, and the
rule would exclude reconstituted proof of the originals‘
content. Under the circumstances here, no ―reconstruction‖
can substitute for the original.133

128. Id. at 1317; see FED. R. EVID. 1004(1).
129. Seiler, 808 F.2d at 1317.
130. Id. at 1318–19.
131. Id. at 1318–19; see FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).
132. Seiler, 808 F.2d at 1320.
133. Id. at 1319. Because of these hurdles to introducing a VR simulation into evidence, the
use of VR technology during trial may fit more comfortably within the framework of traditional
illustrative aids to demonstrate testimony—maps, charts, graphs, cardboard cutouts, and the like.
Unlike demonstrative exhibits, illustrative aids do not have to be admissible into evidence for an
attorney to use them during trial presentation. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Their
singular function is to illustrate the testimony of a witness or to demonstrate a point made by counsel
in argument. See id. Attorneys employ illustrative aides for ―pedagogical‖ ends, not for the truth of
their contents. See id. The case of Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel, 803 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986), is
illustrative of this distinction. Great Lakes Steel challenged the admission into evidence of one of
Gomez‘s exhibits, a summary of actual damages. Id. at 257. On appeal, the United States Court of
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On the other hand, the best evidence rule may provide a justification for
admitting a VR simulation into evidence.134 A ―mechanical or electronic
recording‖ or ―other form of data compilation‖ is a writing or recording for
the purposes of the best evidence rule.135 ―‗Photographs‘ include still
photographs, X-ray films, video tapes, and ‗motion pictures.‘‖136 As the
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1001 explains:
Traditionally the rule requiring the original centered upon
accumulations of data and expressions affecting legal
relations set forth in words and figures. This meant that the
rule was one essentially related to writings. Present day

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the challenged exhibit was improperly admitted into
evidence. In reaching that conclusion, the court explained:
Contents of charts or summaries admitted as evidence under Rule 1006 must
fairly represent and be taken from underlying documentary proof which is too
voluminous for convenient in-court examination, and they must be accurate and
nonprejudicial. . . . Such summaries or charts admitted as evidence under Rule
1006 are to be distinguished from summaries or charts used as pedagogical
devices which organize or aid the jury‘s examination of testimony or documents
which are themselves admitted into evidence. . . . Such pedagogical devices
―are more akin to argument than evidence . . . .‖
Id. (citations omitted).
Because of this distinction between demonstrative exhibits that are admitted into evidence and
aids that are used for illustrative purposes only, the best evidence rule would be inapplicable if a
witness only identified an IVE ―as a correct representation of events which he saw or of a scene with
which he is familiar.‖ FED. R. EVID. 1002 advisory committee‘s notes. See also United States v.
Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir.
1996) (―[A] tape recording cannot be said to be the best evidence of a conversation when a party
seeks to call a participant in or observer of the conversation to testify to it. In that instance, the best
evidence rule has no application at all.‖). The rule would apply, on the other hand, if a witness
sought to testify about the contents of an IVE without producing the physical item, particularly if the
witness was not privy to the events the IVE depicted. See FED. R. EVID. 1002 advisory committee‘s
notes; Bennett, 363 F.3d at 953.
This distinction between demonstrative exhibits and illustrative aids is not observed in all
jurisdictions. Even the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly address the in-court use of
illustrative aids that are not admitted into evidence.
134. The best evidence rule requires the production of an original document rather than a copy.
FED. R. EVID. 1002. Specifically, the rule provides that the original of a recording or photograph is
required to prove the content thereof. Id.; see also Bennett, 363 F.3d at 953. Rule 1002 states: ―To
prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress.‖ FED. R.
EVID. 1002. Under this test, while perfect identity is not required, the admissibility of a
demonstrative exhibit again depends upon a foundational showing that there is a substantial
similarity between the exhibit and the item that it seeks to re-create. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(4),
1002, 1004; see also Bennett, 363 F.3d at 953. If an issue were raised as to whether an IVE correctly
reflected its contents, such issue would be for the jury to decide, along with all of the other factual
disputes in the case, and would not be a ground for exclusion by the court. See FED. R. EVID. 1008.
135. FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).
136. FED. R. EVID. 1001(2).
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techniques have expanded methods of storing data, yet the
essential form which the information ultimately assumes for
usable purposes is words and figures.
Hence the
considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion to
include computers, photographic systems, and other modern
developments.137
The recent Bennett case demonstrates how an IVE might be not only
admissible, but required to be admitted into evidence under the best evidence
rule. Drug enforcement agents observed Bennett‘s boat quickly traveling
north along the California coastline off the coast of San Diego, near, but north
of, the Mexican border.138 When the boat reached San Diego Bay, the agents
boarded and searched the boat, eventually discovering more than a thousand
pounds of hidden marijuana stashed onboard.139 Bennett was charged with
importation of marijuana.140 It is an element of illegal importation of a
controlled substance that the defendant bring the substance into the United
States from ―any place outside thereof.‖141 To prove that Bennett had
imported the marijuana found in his boat into the United States from Mexico,
the government introduced the testimony of a customs officer who testified,
over Bennett‘s evidentiary objections, that he had discovered a global
positioning system (GPS) while searching Bennett‘s boat and that the
―backtrack‖ feature of the GPS, which graphed the boat‘s journey that day,
revealed that Bennett‘s boat had traveled from Rosarita, Mexico, to San Diego
Bay.142 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the admission of the agent‘s GPS testimony was improper and
reversed Bennett‘s conviction.143 The court found that the best evidence rule
applied to the agent‘s GPS testimony because it involved his description of
the content of a graphical description of data that the GPS had compiled about
the path of Bennett‘s boat when the agent himself had not observed the boat
travel the path depicted by the GPS.144 The court found that the GPS data

137. FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee‘s notes. But see 6 WEINSTEIN‘S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 1001.03 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2010).
138. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 949.
139. Id. at 949–50.
140. Id. at 949; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
141. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (2006); Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952; United States v. Cabaccang, 332
F.3d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
142. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952.
143. Id. at 949.
144. Id. at 953 (citation omitted); see also State v. Springer, 197 S.E.2d 530, 536 (N.C. 1973)
(explaining that proponents of computer-generated evidence occasionally flounder on the best
evidence rule by presenting oral testimony based on a witness‘s review of computer data rather than
introducing the actual data into evidence).

1096

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:1073

itself was the best evidence of the boat‘s travels.145 By the same token, if an
expert witness had access to technology that could generate an immersive
model of a crime or accident scene, for instance, the model itself could be the
best evidence of the data that it contained, rather than the expert‘s live
testimony.
IV. AUTHENTICITY
All evidence submitted to a court must be authenticated—to wit, proven to
be what the proponent claims it is.146 As commentators have previously
noted, ―evidence often must be authenticated on several levels, [and s]cience
and technology add another level.‖147 ―The inherent mutability of electronic
data‖ raises questions about the applicability of traditional methods of
authentication to IVEs.148 The authenticity of digital objects cannot be tested
by inspection alone.149 Some commentators suggest that the ―unique potential
for fraud with electronic evidence has diminished the value‖ of the traditional
circumstantial methods of authentication.150
The basic concern of authentication remains the same, however, with any
type of physical evidence. As one commentator notes, ―While the advent of
digital technology has expanded the ways in which documents can be
145. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 954.
146. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). For a witness to authenticate an IVE as documentary evidence by
recognition, under Rule 901(b)(1), the witness would have to be able to identify and describe the
IVE, attest to its genuineness, and provide a rational basis for her recognition of it. See FED. R.
EVID. 901(b)(1). Because VR is a comparatively new technology, a proponent of an IVE would
likely be required to demonstrate the authenticity of the representations contained therein, unlike the
proponent of a more traditional type of visual media.
By contrast, the only foundation that would have to be laid to use an IVE as an illustrative aid to
testimony would be that the IVE would assist in presenting a witness‘s testimony. As a general rule,
as long as a witness could testify that the IVE was illustrative of her testimony, it could be used as an
illustrative aid. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
147. RICE, supra note 88, at 393. In addition to authenticating the IVE as fairly and accurately
depicting the scene that it purported to re-create, the process used to generate the IVE would also
have to be authenticated by a witness who could describe the process or system used to produce the
IVE images and demonstrate that the process or system produced an accurate result. FED. R.
EVID. 901(b)(9); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. App. 2001); Sommervold v. Grevlos,
518 N.W.2d 733, 738 (S.D. 1994). By contrast, proponents of photographs are rarely required to
make a foundational showing of the accuracy of the discipline of photography prior to admission of a
photograph into evidence. See, e.g., Rodd v. Raritan Radiological Assocs., 860 A.2d 1003, 1011–12
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that ―the use of a computer-generated exhibit requires a
more detailed foundation than that for just photographs or photo enlargements‖ and contrasting the
required foundation for computer-generated exhibits with that of photographs or photo
enlargements). Such authenticity could be established via deposition, declaration, requests for
admission, expert testimony, and metadata (such as embedded file creation and modification dates).
DURANSKE, supra note 3, at 53.
148. RICE, supra note 88, at 335.
149. See PAUL, supra note 15, at 21–23.
150. RICE, supra note 88, at 335.
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corrupted or forged, it has also expanded the ways in which they can be
authenticated.‖151 The language of authenticity rules like Rule 901 establishes
a variable benchmark of reliability that depends upon what the proponent of
the IVE claimed the proffered evidence was.152 The proponent would have to
be able to establish that the proffered item‘s purported content was complete,
unaltered, and originated from an identifiable source.153 The proponent would
not have to show that the IVE‘s content was true.154 An item of evidence
making an erroneous or even untruthful assertion can unquestionably still be
authentic.155 ―Accuracy is not the issue.‖156
Like any photograph, an IVE could be authenticated by testimony from a
sponsoring witness with personal knowledge of the scene or incident that it
purported to re-create that the IVE accurately reproduced the scene of the
crime or accident as the witness remembered it.157 The mere fact that a
witness observed an event reconstructed in an IVE would not change the
source of her personal knowledge.
An IVE also might be able to be authenticated through expert testimony
about the creation of the IVE, the source of the representations contained in it,
and its ability to accurately re-create the events and perceptions as reported.158
When expert testimony is employed to prove the authenticity of an IVE,
authorship and recognition become proxies for the IVE‘s identity and
authenticity.
151. Id.
152. The specific provision in Rule 901(b)(9) governs computer-generated evidence when the
accuracy of a particular result of a computer-generated process depends upon the accuracy of the
system or process producing it. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
153. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
154. Id.
155. See PAUL, supra note 15, at 33.
156. Id.
157. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (permitting authentication through testimony of a witness
with knowledge).
158. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (permitting authentication through evidence of a process or
system); State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 8–9 (Iowa 2003) (holding that expert‘s testimony was
sufficient to authenticate computer-generated animated slides as illustrative evidence of shaken-baby
syndrome); Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1180–82 (Pa. 2006) (holding that the testimony
of the creator of a computer-generated animation that his program produced an accurate graphic
presentation of his opinion was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the animation even though
the creator had no firsthand knowledge of the crime, but rather based the reconstruction on the
physical evidence, measurements, and other information provided by other witnesses);
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 778 (Pa. 2007) (admitting a computer-generated videotape
of shaken-baby syndrome in conjunction with expert‘s testimony about the cause of the injury and
the accuracy of the animation based upon all of the available evidence); Dolan v. Florida,743 So. 2d
544, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (―Where there is testimony as to the nature of the store‘s video
security system, the placement of the film in the camera, how the camera worked, the circumstances
of removal of the tape and chain of possession of the tape, such testimony is sufficient authentication
of the tape.‖).

1098

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:1073

V. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE RELIABILITY OF IVE METHODOLOGY
The impediments that a proponent of an IVE would face, under Rule 403,
the best evidence rule, or Rule 901, are chiefly matters of foundation, i.e., the
admissibility of an IVE turns on whether the proponent could establish its
accuracy, reliability, and authenticity.159 Another potential obstacle to the
admissibility of IVE evidence is the barrier posed by the hearsay rule if the
VR model is the product of information gathered or generated by humans
outside of the courtroom. Computer-generated evidence can be based on outof-court statements by witnesses not subject to cross-examination and offered,
at least in part, to show the truth of those statements. A jury entering an IVE
(or even the proponent of the exhibit) likely would not know what
components of the IVE were based on information from third-party sources,
much less have a way to evaluate the credibility of those sources and their
information, and the opposing party has no opportunity to cross-examine
those sources.160
Because of these foundational hurdles, an IVE often would be used at trial
in conjunction with expert opinion testimony establishing the reliability of the
IVE methodology.161 Admission of IVE evidence that could not rest upon the
traditional foundations for substantive evidence could be accomplished as
either part of the basis for expert opinion testimony,162 an illustrative aid to
159. IVEs could also be subject to a hearsay objection. Some of the representations in an IVE
model are not based on the personal knowledge of the individual who designed the model. As a
consequence, hearsay, and multiple levels of it, could be a problem, given that those representations
are being presented to the jury for their truth. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
160. Of course, these hearsay concerns arise only if the IVE is offered as substantive evidence
to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein. See id.; Jennifer Robinson Boyle, Note, State v.
Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the Future and Allow Computer Animations in
Criminal Trials?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 371, 411 (1994):
Demonstrative evidence does not qualify as hearsay because it is not
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Its function is to illustrate
expert testimony. It follows that because the computer animation was used
solely as demonstrative evidence [to illustrate the witness‘s testimony ], it is not
subject to the hearsay rule.
Id.; see also James E. Carbine & Lynn McLain, Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility
of Computer-Generated Evidence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1999)
(noting that hearsay concerns are implicated only for ―computer-generated evidence . . . offered as
substantive evidence‖).
161. See, e.g., Serge, 896 A.2d at 1179–80.
162. For example, a crime or accident scene reconstructionist or a medical examiner could
testify about the cause and manner of an accident or a victim‘s death using an IVE as a visual
presentation to illustrate his or her conclusions reached. In People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), the first reported case to address a litigant‘s use of a graphic computer
animation at trial, a New York trial court admitted a computer reenactment of a fatal car crash to
illustrate defense expert testimony that the accident was the result of weather rather than the
defendant‘s intoxication on the theory that the reenactment was ―more akin to a chart or diagram than
a scientific device‖ even though it had been ―drawn by means of a computer.‖ Id. at 722; see also
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expert testimony,163 or a stand-alone exhibit introduced through the testimony
of an expert involved in creating the IVE.164
IVEs are, in a sense, expert environments. The IVE is not just a snapshot
of the scene, but rather a computer model created to represent the scene. An
expert witness is needed to explain to the inexpert jury the array of
sophisticated methodological and interpretive techniques and assumptions that
were involved in the creation of the IVE.
Under Rule 702, an expert may assist a jury with testimony ―in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.‖165 Traditionally, this ―otherwise‖ has included
tools like analogies and visual representations.166 The factual basis for an
expert opinion can also include hearsay, other information relied upon by
experts in the field,167 and hypothetical questions.168 Rule 703 allows experts

Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1494–95 (D. Mont. 1995) (allowing the
introduction of a computer simulation upon which an accident reconstruction expert had based his
opinion).
163. As discussed supra note 37, illustrative aids are ordinarily held to a less rigorous standard
than substantive demonstrative evidence—namely, whether they aid the jury in understanding some
fact of consequence in the case. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 212 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999). See, e.g., Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 579 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that illustrative
evidence is admitted solely to help a witness explain his testimony and has no probative value
beyond that lent to it by the credibility of the witness whose testimony it illustrates); Hinkle v.
Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 424 (4th Cir. 1996); People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 140 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. App. 2001); Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806,
808–09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999);
State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2003); Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863, pp. 46–
48 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/97); 712 So. 2d 885, 900–01; State v. Harvey, 26,613, pp. 9–12 (La. App.
2 Cir. 1/25/95); 649 So. 2d 783, 788; Serge, 896 A.2d at 1179.
Nonetheless, some courts have subjected computer-generated images to the more demanding
authentication standard for substantive evidence even when the images are offered solely to illustrate
testimony. See, e.g., State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 945 (Conn. 2004) (recognizing the difficulty of
categorically distinguishing substantive and illustrative uses of visual evidence and the persuasive
potential of visual images, and instituting a single, demanding authentication standard for all
computer-generated evidence).
164. See Carbine & McLain, supra note 160, at 4 (―In the above example of an air crash, there
was no expert witness taking the stand to testify as to how the final moments of Flight 162 looked.
The computer itself was the expert.‖).
165. FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). The rule states, in pertinent part: ―If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. . . .‖ Id.
166. See, e.g., Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1976);
Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (noting without
ruling on the issue that ―[t]he defendants maintain that the animation was not itself a simulation, but
rather, a visual representation of [an expert witness‘s] testimony concerning the results of one
computer simulation program‖).
167. FED. R. EVID. 703; United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643
(D.C. Cir. 1962); State v. Oswalt, 463 P.2d 602, 603 (Or. Ct. App. 1970).
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to testify without personal knowledge of the underlying facts or data and on
the basis of hearsay or other otherwise inadmissible evidence, as long as the
out-of-court sources are of a type ―reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field.‖169 If an expert witness relies upon outside facts in reaching
an opinion, those facts themselves may be admissible.170 If an expert witness
reasonably relied upon an IVE in reaching a conclusion about a material fact
at dispute during trial, the IVE itself might be admissible, even if it would not
have been admissible as a stand-alone demonstrative exhibit.171
The underlying standard for the admissibility of scientific or technical
expert evidence in all jurisdictions, whether under the traditional Frye172
general-acceptance standard or the federal Rule 702173/Daubert174 standard, is
reliability.175
168. See Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1301 (8th Cir. 1980) (explaining that a
hypothetical question need not include all facts shown by the evidence, but must be ―in such a form
as not to mislead or confuse the jury‖); Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern
Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 49 (2006).
169. Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added). See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 566 (6th Cir. 1993).
170. FED. R. EVID. 705; United States v. McCollum, 732 F.2d 1419, 1422–23 (9th Cir. 1984).
171. In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the Supreme Court recognized that the
parties have a right to present evidence in the form that they deem best suited to meet jurors‘
expectations about what proof would be persuasive, even if that evidence is not logically necessary to
the jury‘s verdict. Thus, if IVE-based expert testimony itself were admissible, the proponent of the
IVE evidence should be allowed to publish the IVE to the jury to avoid being unfairly prejudiced by
having failed to live up to the jury‘s expectations about what computer-simulated evidence looks
like. See id. at 189.
172. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923) (holding that, for expert testimony
regarding a scientific principle or discovery to be admissible, it ―must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs‖). General acceptance
exists when a substantial percentage of the applicable scientific community accepts the theory,
principles, and methodology underlying scientific testimony because they are grounded in valid
scientific principles. See Bonds, 12 F.3d at 562; United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.
1975).
173. FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting an expert to testify to an opinion based upon scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge only ―if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case‖).
174. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (holding that the Frye
test had been superseded by Rule 702 and charging courts with the responsibility to act as
gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony and ensuring that scientific testimony is ―not only
relevant, but reliable‖).
The relevancy requirement stems from Rule 702‘s requirement that the testimony ―assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.‖ FED. R. EVID. 702. Daubert
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The case of United States v. Downing176 illustrates some of the hurdles
and possibilities that a party would face when seeking to use an IVE during a
jury trial. Downing was charged with mail fraud, wire fraud, and interstate
transportation of stolen property arising from a scheme to defraud vendors at
national trade shows by pretending to be a member of the clergy with
excellent credit references and ordering goods on credit without the intention
to pay for them.177 The government‘s case against Downing consisted almost
entirely of eyewitness testimony of twelve individuals who identified
Downing as the fictional Reverend Claymore on the basis of brief interactions
that they had with him years earlier.178 Downing sought to adduce, from a
cognitive psychologist with expertise in human perception and memory,
testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications.179 The
district court refused to admit the testimony, based upon the belief that such
testimony would not be ―helpful[]‖ to the jury under Rule 702.180 The United
States Court of Appeals reversed the district court.181 The appeals court held
that such testimony was admissible if the reliability of the scientific principles
upon which it rested, and therefore the potential of the testimony to aid the
jury in reaching an accurate resolution of a disputed issue, outweighed the
likelihood that introduction of the testimony would, in some way, overwhelm
or mislead the jury.182 The court also stated that such testimony was
admissible if Downing could make a specific proffer that scientific research

set forth a non-exhaustive checklist for assessing the reliability of scientific testimony: (1) whether
the technique or theory can be tested or challenged in some objective manner (rather than a
subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability); (2) whether the
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate
of error of the technique; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5)
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community. Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593–94.
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999), the Supreme Court clarified that
the courts‘ gatekeeper function applied to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony, and
indicated that the Daubert factors could be applicable in assessing the reliability of nonscientific
expert testimony. In 2000, Rule 702 was amended to codify Kumho Tire‘s amplified scope of
application. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee‘s notes.
175. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Frye, 293 F. at 1014. But see
Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1176 n.3 (Pa. 2006) (holding that, because a computergenerated animation was a graphic illustration of an expert‘s reconstruction, it was not subject to the
Frye test for admissibility).
176. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
177. Id. at 1227.
178. Id. at 1227–28.
179. See id. at 1228.
180. Id. at 1226; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.
181. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
182. Id.
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had established that particular features of the eyewitness identifications
involved may have impaired the accuracy of the identifications.183
To be used during trial in any form (as demonstrative evidence, an
illustrative aid to testimony, or as the basis for an expert‘s opinion about a
material issue in the case), an IVE would almost certainly be subject to some
type of relevancy and balancing test fundamentally akin to the one spelled out
by the court in Downing. No matter the specific evidentiary function of an
IVE, its proponent would have to be able to make some manner of
foundational demonstration that the technology supporting it was reliable and
accurate enough to outweigh its inherent dangers of distortion.184 The court‘s
finding of the systemic and methodological reliability of IVE technology
would underlie its ultimate finding of the authenticity and informational
integrity of a particular IVE exhibit. In other words, reliability would form
the foundation for competency.185
In many ways, the potential use of IVE technology in jury trials today is at
the same stage of development—both in terms of the raw technology and the
legal system‘s acceptance of the use of IVE technology and expert testimony
about it—that the use of DNA analysis for forensic purposes was at a decade
or so ago. These days, expert testimony based upon forensic DNA analysis is
largely unchallenged and often admitted subject to courts‘ taking judicial
notice of its general reliability as forensic evidence.186 But this recognition of
183. Id. at 1226, 1242.
184. See, e.g., Rodd v. Raritan Radiological Assocs., 860 A.2d 1003, 1012 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2009) (requiring ―testimony from a witness who possesses sufficient knowledge of the
technology used to create [computer-generated] exhibits‖ as foundation for their admissibility
because of ―the reliability problems arising from computer-generated exhibits and the processes by
which they are created‖).
185. When X-rays were first discovered, many courts admitted them into evidence not upon
proof of their individual accuracy, but rather upon expert testimony regarding the reliability of the
processes that produced them. Tal Golan, The Emergence of the Silent Witness: The Legal and
Medical Reception of X-rays in the USA, 34 SOC. STUD. SCI. 469, 478 (2004) [hereinafter Golan,
Silent Witness]. See, e.g., Bruce v. Beall, 41 S.W. 445, 446 (Tenn. 1897) (―New as [the X-ray]
process is, experiments made by scientific men, as shown by this record, have demonstrated its
power to reveal to the natural eye the entire structure of the human body, and that its various parts
can be photographed as its exterior surface has been and now is.‖). In time, courts took judicial
notice of the reliability of X-ray technology. See CHARLES C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE:
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION § 791 (1942).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
reliability of the Polymerase Chain Reaction method of DNA analysis was sufficiently well
established to permit courts to take judicial notice of it in all future cases). Rule 201(b) permits a
court to take ―judicial notice‖ of a particular fact when it is ―not subject to reasonable dispute in that
it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.‖ FED. R. EVID. 201(b); see also United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir.
1992); Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355, 362 (Ala. 1998); Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 294 (Ark.
1996); State v. Fleming, 698 A.2d 503, 506–07 (Me. 1997); State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1143
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DNA‘s general reliability and probative value did not happen overnight.
Instead, it was the result of two types of serious undertakings: (1) efforts by
forensic molecular biologists to scientifically validate the consistency and
reproducibility of the methodology and its results, and (2) efforts by attorneys
to fit forensic DNA analysis within the strictures of the rules of evidence. The
same work now needs to be done by VR experts and attorneys seeking to use
IVEs during trial.
The Bonds case provides a blueprint for the type of reliability foundation
that would have to be laid to admit expert testimony based upon IVE
technology. Bonds, a prospective Hell‘s Angel, was charged with federal
firearms offenses along with two other gang members in connection with a
shooting murder.187 The government‘s theory of the shooting was that Bonds
and his co-defendants had mistaken the victim for a member of a rival
motorcycle gang whom they had planned to ―hit‖ in retaliation for a shooting
of a Hell‘s Angel the previous year.188 There were no eyewitnesses to the
shooting, but at the scene of the shooting and in the getaway car there was a
large quantity of blood which did not match the victim‘s blood.189 Bonds had
a ricochet wound in his arm, which the government believed to be the source
of the unidentified blood at the scene.190 The FBI eventually matched a
sample of Bonds‘s blood to the blood at the crime scene and in the getaway
car through DNA identification.191 Bonds‘s defense was mistaken identity.192
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, forensic DNA193 analysis was in its
relative infancy.194 Prior to trial, Bonds challenged the admissibility of the
DNA evidence.195 The magistrate judge ―conducted a six-week Frye hearing
to determine whether the [government‘s] proposed experts‘ trial testimony
about the DNA evidence was based upon principles generally accepted in the
scientific community.‖196 The government‘s experts testified that the FBI‘s
DNA procedures were generally accepted.197 Bonds challenged the DNA
evidence on the ground that the particular methodology that the FBI employed
in performing DNA analysis and the results that the FBI reached were

(Utah 2001).
187. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 546–47 (6th Cir. 1993).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 547.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 549.
192. Id. at 547.
193. ―DNA‖ stands for deoxyribonucleic acid.
194. See Bonds, 12 F.3d at 549–50.
195. Id. at 551.
196. Id. (footnote omitted).
197. Id. at 562.
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unreliable, arguing that, had the tests been performed differently, using a
different database for the calculation of the statistical probabilities of a false
match, different materials in performing the test, or a different multiplication
rule, the results would have been more accurate and perhaps different.198
Bonds also challenged the way that the FBI methodology was tested, arguing
that the FBI‘s probability estimate was imprecise and ―that the reliability of
the results would have been greater had a different method of testing been
employed.‖199 Bonds argued that the FBI‘s procedures for making statisticalprobability estimates were not generally accepted by population geneticists
and molecular biologists.200 Bonds presented evidence about deficiencies in
the accuracy of the match results and the inadequacy of the testing of the
results.201 The defense experts demonstrated that a substantial controversy
existed over whether the results produced were reliable and accurate.202
At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that
the district court admit the DNA evidence.203 In reaching his conclusion, the
magistrate judge issued numerous factual findings about the challenged DNA
evidence.204 The judge credited the expert testimony that established that the
protocol used was generally accepted by other DNA labs.205 He found that the
FBI was able to produce reliable results without a significant risk of false
matches, despite some flaws in the protocol.206 He found that the defects in
the FBI‘s validation studies ―did not affect [the FBI‘s] ability reliably to make
accurate determinations of matches and avoid false positives.‖207 He found
that the FBI‘s methods had received ample acceptance outside of the FBI
lab.208 The district court adopted the magistrate judge‘s report and
recommendation and admitted the expert DNA testimony at trial, over
Bonds‘s objection.209 The court reasoned that it could not examine Bonds‘s
challenges relating to the accuracy of the DNA analysis results, but could only
examine whether the government‘s expert testimony was based on generally
accepted theories and procedures.210

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 558–59.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 563.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld
the district court‘s decision to admit the evidence under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.211 In doing so, the court reasoned that the
evidence that Bonds‘s DNA partially matched the DNA found in the crime
scene sample was relevant to whether Bonds was present at the scene on the
night of the murder and, therefore, helpful to the jury in determining whether
he was guilty of the charges.212 More importantly, the court found that
evidence credited by the district court established that the theory behind
matching DNA and calculating false-match probabilities and the particular
technique that the FBI lab employed could be tested by comparing the results
generated from one set of samples with the results reached after repeating the
matching and probability estimate process on control samples, concluding that
it was ―irrelevant that there are other methods for DNA matching that could
also be or have been tested.‖213 The court found that the FBI‘s principles and
methodology had been tested by internal proficiency testing, validation
studies, and environmental insult studies to determine whether the lab could
produce reliable, reproducible results from samples that had been mixed with
contaminants or subjected to environmental insults.214 The court concluded
that it was ―clear that the FBI‘s theories, principles, methods, and techniques
can be tested and have in fact been tested.‖215 The court found that ―the
theory behind ‗matching‘ DNA itself and the general procedures used to come
up with the forensic results clearly have received peer evaluation.‖216 While
the court was ―troubl[ed]‖ by the FBI‘s deficiencies in calculating the rate of
error and by the lack of external blind proficiency testing, it held that the other
Daubert factors outweighed its concerns with the error rate because the
general acceptance of the methodology in the scientific community implied
that ―the rate of error is acceptable to the scientific community as well.‖217
The court held: ―Disputes about specific techniques used or the accuracy of
the results generated go to the weight, not the admissibility of the scientific
evidence.‖218 The court further noted: ―[N]either newness nor lack of absolute
certainty in a test suffices to render it inadmissible in court. Every useful new
development must have its first day in court.‖219 The court held that general

211.
in Bonds.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 554. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Daubert between the trial and appeal
See id. at 554 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id. (citation omitted).
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acceptance encompassed both the theory of DNA profiling and the FBI‘s
methodology for conducting DNA testing.220 The court explained:
[W]hile ordinarily the principles and procedures must be
accepted by a majority of those in the pertinent scientific
community, the absence of a majority does not necessarily
rule out general acceptance. The general acceptance test is
designed only to uncover whether there is a general
agreement of scientists in the field that [these] scientific data
[are] not based on a novel theory or procedure that is ―mere
speculation or conjecture.‖ In some instances, there may be
several different theories or procedures used concerning one
type of scientific evidence, all of which are generally
accepted. None may have the backing of the majority of
scientists, yet the theory or procedure can still be generally
accepted. And even substantial criticism as to one theory or
procedure will not be enough to find that the theory/procedure
is not generally accepted. Only when a theory or procedure
does not have the acceptance of most of the pertinent
scientific community, and in fact a substantial part of the
scientific community disfavors the principle or procedure,
will it not be generally accepted.221
The court held that ―the degree of acceptance in the scientific community
of the theory of DNA profiling and of the basic procedures used by the lab in
this case is sufficient to meet the requirements . . . for general acceptance.‖222
The court concluded: ―[G]eneral acceptance is required as to the principles
and methodology employed. The assessment of the validity and reliability of
the conclusions drawn by the expert is a jury question; the judge may only
examine whether the principles and methodology are scientifically valid and
generally accepted.‖223 The court held that ―the Government experts‘
testimony was based on data and facts reasonably relied upon by experts in
molecular biology and population genetics.‖224
Following this blueprint, the lesson from Bonds is clear. A proponent of
expert testimony wanting the jury to enter an IVE and consider its contents as
substantive evidence would need to lay the necessary foundation to establish
the following: (1) the IVE was relevant to a material dispute in the case (e.g.,
the vantage point of an eyewitness or a party); (2) the field of IVE generally,
and the expert witness‘s IVE protocols in particular, were generally accepted
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 562.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 566.
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among the relevant scientific community, presumably VR computer experts;
(3) the expert witness had the ability to produce reliable and accurate IVEs
without significant distortion; and (4) the IVE protocols and their accuracy
had been scientifically validated and subjected to peer review, and there was
some meaningful way to define and measure error within the IVEs created.
The case of State v. Clark225 provides an example, in the context of
computer-assisted crime scene reconstruction, of how these foundational
requirements could be met. Clark was charged with the murder of Tanya
Banks, who died of a gunshot wound to the abdomen.226 Clark‘s defense was
that Banks had accidentally shot herself.227 A forensic photographer and
crime reconstructionist testified for the State about his reconstruction of the
bathroom in which Banks was shot, which he generated using computer
software that permitted him to rotate his reconstruction and look at it from
different positions.228 For the purpose of reconstruction, the expert made
assumptions about the bullet‘s trajectory and the position of Banks‘s body at
the time of the shooting, based on information contained in the coroner‘s
report, the physical evidence in the bathroom, and Banks‘s physical
dimensions and posture.229 During his testimony, the expert used blown-up
printouts of the computer-generated drawings of the bathroom to explain the
results and conclusions of his report to the jury.230 The expert acknowledged
that it was impossible to place Banks and the assailant in their exact positions
at the time of the fatal shooting, but concluded that the accident scene was not
consistent with a self-inflicted injury.231
On appeal, Clark argued that the expert‘s testimony was not based upon
sufficiently reliable grounds, in violation of Ohio‘s rule of evidence,232 which
was substantially identical to its federal counterpart.233 The Ohio Eighth
District Court of Appeals rejected Clark‘s argument, holding that the expert‘s
testimony was sufficiently reliable.234 The court found that ―the field of crime
scene reconstruction through the use of computer-generated simulations or
computer-assisted drafting‖ had gained general acceptance.235 Accordingly,
the expert testimony would assist the fact finder in the search for the truth,
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

655 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 798–99.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 801–02.
Id. at 807–08.
See FED. R. EVID. 702; OHIO R. EVID. 702.
Clark, 655 N.E.2d at 813.
Id.
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and the danger of unfair prejudice to Clark was prevented by the State‘s
timely disclosure of the expert‘s report and underlying data and Clark‘s
opportunity to cross-examine the expert at trial.236
Similarly, in Swinton, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the
admission of digitally enhanced photographs of bite marks after foundation
for their authenticity had been provided by the State‘s expert in digital image
enhancement.237 The court noted:
First, [the expert witness] testified that the computer
equipment is accepted as standard equipment in the field. He
testified that the Lucis program was relied upon by experts in
the field of pattern analysis in a forensic setting. He further
testified that the program had been used in ―fingerprint
pattern identification, bloodstain pattern identification,
footwear and tire impression identification, and in bite mark
identification.‖ Second, it was established that a qualified
computer operator produced the enhancement. [The expert
witness‘s] testimony clearly demonstrated that he was well
versed in the Lucis program. He was a well trained and
highly experienced forensic analyst, and he testified to his
qualifications as an expert in the analysis of pattern evidence
and the enhancement of that evidence . . . .
Third, the state presented evidence that proper procedures
were followed in connection with the input and output of
information. During direct examination, [the expert witness]
testified accurately, clearly, and consistently regarding the
process of the digitization of the image—wherein a
photograph is transformed into pixels . . . —and how [he]
then had used the Lucis software to select comparable points
of contrast and array them into layers. He also testified as to
how the Lucis program then diminished certain layers in
order to heighten the visual appearance of the bite mark. . . .
Importantly, [the expert witness] compared the enhanced
photographs with the unenhanced photographs in front of the
jury.
Fourth, the state adequately demonstrated that Lucis is a
reliable software program.238
If experts can attest to an adequate foundation for the reliability of the
science on which proffered IVEs are based, courts should address the
potential challenges that IVE exhibits create not by excluding those exhibits,
236. Id. at 814.
237. State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 943–44 (Conn. 2004).
238. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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but rather by admitting them and educating the jury about the extent of
acceptable interpretations. Jurors can be taught to understand what computer
scientists already understand: that IVEs are not ―snapshots‖ of the scenes that
they represent, but rather highly mediated outputs of computer-science design,
and that their probative value depends upon the nature of the mediations (i.e.,
the validity of the underlying theories, concepts, and principles that guide the
translations from underlying data to final visual representation). Jurors can be
instructed to interpret IVEs in light of their context within the relevant
computer-science discourse.
Despite their epistemic risks, IVEs should not simply be excluded. That
jurors may require expert testimony to help them interpret IVEs is not a
reason to exclude them. The expert is the interpreter of the IVE. Expert
testimony will frame the IVE, from its authentication to the interpretation of
its representations. The foundation needed to authenticate the IVE, for
example,239 will prompt jurors to focus on the model‘s mediated facets, and
cross-examination should expose the limitations of the IVE to prove the fact
at issue. To presume otherwise is to presume that expert witnesses are unable
to set forth the science clearly enough for jurors to comprehend it.240 When
an expert‘s testimony accompanies an IVE in court, each makes the other
more intelligible and persuasive and less misleading or unfairly prejudicial.
The expert testimony and the IVE elucidate one another, maximizing the
likelihood that the jury‘s factual findings will be based upon the most reliable
science.
VI. JURY VIEW
In addition to the foundational hurdles of establishing the accuracy,
reliability, and authenticity of an IVE prior to its admission into evidence or
―publication‖ to the jury, a party (or court) seeking to place a jury in an IVE
239. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (stating that one form of authentication is ―showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result‖).
240. When expert scientific testimony is clearly presented, jurors largely attain a satisfactory
level of comprehension and use the testimony appropriately to improve their findings and
conclusions. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1174 (2000). When jurors come to court with preconceived ideas that are
incompatible with legal rules, they are more likely to follow the law rather than their preconceptions
if those preconceptions are directly identified and addressed. See generally Shari Seidman
Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts,
and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 513 (1992) (arguing that an active jury is more effective than
a passive jury); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal
Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 858 (1991); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior
Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 507 (1993).
It follows, then, that if jurors hold misconceptions about VR, recognizing and addressing those
misconceptions through expert testimony reduces the likelihood that they will be driven by their
misconceptions of what the images mean in rendering judgment.
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as part of its fact-finding inquiry would face a larger and more conceptual
hurdle: there has simply never been anything like it done in a jury trial before.
Unlike its counterparts in continental Europe, the Anglo-American system of
justice is adversarial, not inquisitorial.241 The presentation of evidence is
driven almost entirely by the parties, through their attorneys.242 The judge is a
―referee,‖ and the jury is merely a passive observer.243 Because of this
adversarial structure, the use of IVEs, which would permit jurors sitting in a
criminal trial to ―enter,‖ interact with, and manipulate a VR model
themselves, is perhaps the most difficult use of VR technology to fit within
traditional conceptions of the rules of evidence and the role of the jury. In an
IVE, jurors would be able to walk around the virtual scene and reach out and
touch virtual objects. As they were viewing the virtual scene, their perceptual
feedback would be constantly updated.
Nonetheless, permitting trial jurors to enter an IVE is not without
precedent. Despite the adversary nature of the criminal justice system, most,
if not all, American jurisdictions have a procedure for a unique inquisitorial
jury function—the jury view.244 Juries are often permitted to visit the scenes
of crimes and accidents in the middle of trial,245 subject to the discretion of the
trial judge,246 even when the scenes that the juries view are no longer in the
same state that they were in at the time of the events in question.247
241. Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod, Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Comparing
Systems, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 2 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003).
242. See id. at 3.
243. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 131, 141 (1988) (explaining that juries are treated as ―passive
recipients of information‖ and the judge as a ―master of ceremonies‖).
244. See United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d 979, 986 (1st Cir. 1990). Federal courts
recognize their authority to permit a jury view of places or objects outside of the courtroom as part of
their inherent supervisory power over trial. Id.
245. See, e.g., Rhonda Cook, Jurors Stay Silent on Visit to Crime Scene, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
May 16, 2009, at A8 (discussing a murder trial jury‘s visit to the scene where the decedent‘s body
was found). The juries in music producer Phil Spector‘s two murder trials also toured his home in
California, the alleged murder scene. Jury Tours Phil Spector‘s Los Angeles Home, Telegraph on
the Web, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/celebritynews/4701976/Jurytours-Phil-Spectors-Los-Angeles-home.html.
While historically there was a split among jurisdictions, almost all jurisdictions today consider a
jury viewing of a crime scene or other location to constitute the receipt of ―evidence.‖ See, e.g.,
People v. Bush, 10 P. 169, 173–75 (Cal. 1886); 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1168 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1972).
246. United States v. Pettiford, 962 F.2d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 1992); Casias v. United States, 302
F.2d 513, 514 (10th Cir. 1962); Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelley, 131 F.2d 627, 628
(5th Cir. 1942); Van De Putte v. Cameron County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 7,
35 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (permitting the jury to view the premises in dispute).
247. See, e.g., Dickson v. Yale Univ., 105 A.2d 463, 464–65 (Conn. 1954) (upholding the trial
court‘s permission allowing the jury to view the premises of an accident that occurred when Dickson
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Generally, the scene has been altered through the process of crime scene
investigation and preservation, accident reconstruction, or merely the passage
of time.248 It has been cleaned up, and crucial evidence has been removed for
laboratory analysis. For example, in a homicide case, the body of the
decedent will certainly have been removed so that an autopsy can be
performed, biological evidence will have been removed for DNA analysis, the
murder weapon will have been removed for ballistics analysis, and so on.
Juries generally do not even visit scenes at the same time of day or under the
same conditions as when the alleged crime was committed or the accident
occurred.249
Nonetheless, despite these distortions, the common law
recognizes that the probative value of an on-site view of the scene outweighs
the potential unfair prejudice or jury confusion that may result from an
imperfect facsimile of the scene and leaves to argument by the parties the
weight that the jury should place on the imperfections.250 Juries have been
permitted to view a scene by going to the scene of the crime or accident and
investigating it themselves, if doing so would aid them in reaching a correct
result,251 as long as the scene remains in a substantially similar condition as it
fell off of a balcony without a guardrail even though the jury could have seen that a guardrail had
subsequently been installed).
248. See generally Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (holding that the negligent
failure of the police to refrigerate the victim‘s clothing and to perform tests on semen samples during
a child molestation investigation did not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of bad
faith).
For example, in the infamous O.J. Simpson murder trial, jurors were permitted to view
Simpson‘s home to illustrate testimony regarding his bloody socks that were allegedly recovered
there, even though the socks, of course, were no longer at the scene at the time of the viewing. See
Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the
O.J. Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 309–11 (1998). In addition, the jury was permitted
to the view the scene after Simpson‘s attorneys had altered the decor by replacing multiple pictures
of white women (including a nude picture of Simpson‘s white girlfriend) with pictures depicting
African-Americans (including a famous Norman Rockwell painting depicting a black schoolgirl
being escorted to a recently desegrated school by National Guard troops). Id.; George Fisher, The
O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 978 (1997).
249. See, e.g., Rau v. Redwood City Woman‘s Club, 245 P.2d 12, 17 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952)
(―The mere fact that changes have occurred at the scene of an accident does not necessarily prevent a
view of the scene by the jury.‖); Miller v. Anchor Cas. Co., 45 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Minn. 1951)
(―[T]he possibility that a view will aid the jury in understanding the evidence in these actions cannot
be precluded merely because some period of time has transpired since the accident occurred.‖).
250. See Rau, 245 P.2d at 17.
251. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1119 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.50 (2002)
(providing that a court may permit the jury, prior to closing argument, to view or observe the crime
scene or any other premises or place involved in the case when doing so would be helpful to the jury
in determining any material fact at issue); WASH. CRIM. R. 6.9 (giving a trial court discretion to
permit the jury to view the crime scene); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-502 (2009) (―When the court
considers it proper that the jury view any place or personal property pertinent to the case, it will order
the jury to be conducted in a body . . . to view the place or personal property . . . .‖); see also
People v. King, 534 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a crime scene can be
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was in at the time of the alleged crime or accident.252 A few courts have
permitted jury views that were ―interactive‖ in nature.253
The purpose of permitting a jury to view the scene is to enable it better to
understand and apply the evidence produced in court.254 As the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court has explained:
It is a well-understood fact that an individual familiar with the
locality can better and more accurately understand the
testimony of the witnesses describing scenes occurring
therein than a stranger who is dependent entirely upon the
description given by the witnesses. A criminal trial is to
ascertain the facts . . . .255
If anything, an IVE created to simulate the scene of a crime or accident so
that the jury can virtually view it would be a more accurate way to reconstruct
the scene as it was at the time of the events in question, since the IVE could
simulate the time of day, presence of the physical evidence, and so on, in a
way that the actual scene, stripped of much of its material evidence prior to
jury viewing, could not.256 Perhaps the greatest danger presented by a live
view of a crime or accident scene is the risk that extraneous, irrelevant, or
unfairly prejudicial information would reach the jury, either in the form of
communication or comments by one of those present at the scene, or
inappropriate sights seen by jurors.257 Because IVEs can be designed with
―gaze-directed‖ steering techniques and ―locked‖ fields of view, which
prevent lateral head movements, they can restrict jurors to a literal ―three-

viewed by the jury as long as it is told of the changes).
252. See People v. White, 416 N.Y.S.2d 260, 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (citation omitted),
rev’d on other grounds by New York v. White, 421 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1981); cf. People v. Postell,
629 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in permitting the jury to view the crime scene even though a scaffolding had been removed
since the murder because ―the jury could easily reconstruct the exact scene‖ and the viewing was
―helpful to the jury in assisting it to determine what the eyewitnesses to the crime saw and heard‖).
253. See, e.g., Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 262 P.2d 95, 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1953) (upholding a trial court‘s decision to permit a jury view of a streetcar that included a
demonstration of the functioning of its door); State v. O‘Day, 175 So. 838, 842 (La. 1937)
(upholding the trial court‘s decision to permit witnesses to testify at a jury view of a crime scene);
Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Const. Co., 144 S.E. 881, 883 (W. Va. 1928) (upholding the trial court‘s
decision to permit the jury to view a power saw in operation).
254. State v. Gone, 587 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Mont. 1978); State v. Land, 851 P.2d 678, 682
(Wash. 1993).
255. White, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (citation omitted).
256. However, this decision would remain discretionary with the trial judge. Thompson v.
South Carolina Highway Dep‘t, 70 S.E.2d 241, 243–44 (S.C. 1952) (upholding a trial court decision
that the availability of photographic evidence rendered a jury view undesirable).
257. See, e.g., People v. Stanley, 665 N.E.2d 190, 191 (N.Y. 1996) (finding reversible error
after jurors conducted an experiment at the crime scene).
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dimensional tour‖ of the scene, ensuring that each juror gets the exact same
optic flow as any other,258 as opposed to a live scene view, where each juror
can look anywhere that she wants in the scene, and not all jurors leave having
viewed the same scene.
One of the original rationales for the admissibility of crime scene
photographs into evidence was that they were an improved but functional
equivalent of a crime scene viewing by the jury.259 The case of Mardoff v.
State260 is an example. Mardoff was convicted of the murder of his wife by
stabbing her twenty times in bed.261 On appeal, Mardoff challenged the
introduction into evidence of gruesome photographs of his dead wife, with the
weapon still embedded in her body.262 In the photographs she appeared as she
did when she was discovered by the police when they entered the crime scene
on the night of the murder: propped up against the wall between the foot of
the bed and a bookcase standing nearby.263 Four of the photographs were
taken of the room in which the murder was committed and the body found
before the body was moved, and the fifth was taken without any
rearrangement of any of the objects in the room except that the body had been
lifted from the wall, exposing the hilt of a Chinese dagger protruding from the
victim‘s back, to show how the weapon that caused the death had been
plunged into the victim‘s back and left there.264 Rejecting Mardoff‘s
challenge, the Florida Supreme Court explained:
The value of a pictorial representation of the scene of a
crime is obvious. From the very nature of the crime of
homicide it is not possible for the trial jury to view the
premises before physical appearance of the scene is changed
by removal of the victim‘s body. It is common knowledge
258. This ―locking‖ is analogous to the redaction of physical exhibits, often performed by the
old-fashioned media of black pen and photocopier.
259. See Thompson, 70 S.E.2d at 243. Similarly, courts admitted newly discovered X-rays into
evidence relatively quickly based on the rationale that they were a specialized category of
conventional photography and, therefore, illustrative aides to medical testimony. See Golan, Silent
Witness, supra note 185, at 474–77; W.W. Goodrich, The Legal Status of the X-Ray, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF NEW YORK 235 (1904); Edward C. Halperin, X-Rays
at the Bar, 1896–1910, 23 INVESTIGATIVE RADIOLOGY 639 (1988); Orlando F. Scott,
Röntgenograms and their Chronological Legal Recognition, 24 ILL. L. REV. 674, 676 (1930). See,
e.g., Miller v. Dumon, 64 P. 804, 805 (Wash. 1901) (―[T]here would seem to be no reason for
making a distinction between an X-ray and a common photograph; that is, either is admissible as
evidence when verified by proof that it is a true representation of an object which is the subject of
inquiry.‖).
260. 196 So. 625 (Fla. 1940).
261. Id. at 626.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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that the descriptions given by witnesses, however
conscientious, who have observed the body of a murdered
person and the surroundings will vary often to a surprising
degree. No better way has so far been devised to show the
scene of a homicide than a photograph taken before the body
of the deceased and the objects near or around it have been
disturbed.
The admissibility of such evidence must be determined
by the trial judge after an inquiry as to whether the objects
appearing in the picture are in the same position as when the
crime was discovered to preclude fabrication of testimony, for
a picture of the reconstruction of the crime would be harmful
in the same degree that the true representation would be
helpful to the jury in comprehending the real conditions of the
place where the crime was committed.265
This rationale seems equally, if not more, applicable to the use of VR
technology to simulate immersive scenes for juries.
The portrayal of scene evidence has followed a somewhat linear
progression: live viewing, drawings, black-and-white photographs, color
photographs, video recording, and, now, VR simulation. There is no reason
why IVE technology should be subjected to any different or more strenuous
threshold for admissibility than any other representational medium. 266 As the
Florida Supreme Court explained in rejecting a challenge to the then-new
technology of color photography:
We feel that the rule regulating the admissibility of
pictures has been settled and that there is no occasion further
to pursue it except to the point that it might be varied by the
use of prints in color. The argument that there should be a
distinction seems to us specious for the accuracy of a print
should be enhanced by the natural color of the objects
depicted . . . .

265. Id. at 626–27; see Adams v. State, 10 So. 106, 107 (Fla. 1891) (―A map, diagram, or
picture, whether made by the hand of man or by photography, verified as a correct representation of
physical objects about which testimony is offered . . . is admissible in evidence . . . to enable the jury
to better understand the case.‖).
266. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 1992)
(―[W]e treat computer-generated models or simulations like other scientific tests, and condition
admissibility on a sufficient showing that: (1) the computer is functioning properly; (2) the input and
underlying equations are sufficiently complete and accurate . . . ; and (3) the program is generally
accepted by the appropriate community of scientists.‖).
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Our conclusion is that the test in judging admissibility is
one of relevancy and that there is no reason to apply a
separate and distinct rule to pictures in color.267
VII. THE VIRTUAL CRIME SCENE
In the context of a criminal case, there are two additional advantages that
an IVE re-creation of a crime scene would have over a live jury viewing or
other representational evidence. First, an IVE could be controlled in a way
that could eliminate certain Rule 403 concerns without diminishing the
probative value of the evidence. One substantial area of litigation in criminal
jury trials has to do with the gruesome details that are often inherent in
representational media—autopsy photographs, blood spatter patterns, and
ballistics and weapons analysis.268 An IVE simulating the crime scene could
be constructed that would permit a sufficiently, if not more, accurate view of
the crime scene and its pertinent details (the position of the body, the location
where the weapon was discovered, the fatal wounds) without the blood and
guts of video and still photographs.269
Second, the use of an IVE representing the events in question, created by
a VR expert after consultation with the defense team or review of pretrial
discovery materials, might provide a vehicle for a criminal defendant to
introduce evidence of her version of events before the jury and permit the jury
to test that version of events without the defendant having to waive her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. For example, imagine a
murder prosecution where the defense is mistaken self-defense. The
defendant is claiming that she shot someone in an alley that she believed was
attacking her, when in fact the person was in the alley for innocent reasons
unrelated to the defendant. The primary issue at trial is the reasonableness of
the defendant‘s mistaken belief. Ordinarily, for the jury to assess whether the
267. Wilkins v. State, 155 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1963).
268. A judge may exclude evidence under Rule 403 if ―its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.‖ FED.
R. EVID. 403. For a discussion on the impact of gruesome evidence on jury decision making, see
David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and
Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 184–89 (2006). See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 973
So. 2d 380, 393 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Matthews v. State, 99 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ark. 2003); People
v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 555 (Cal. 2007); State v. Satchwell, 710 A.2d 1348, 1362 (Conn. 1998);
State v. Warledo, 190 P.3d 937, 951 (Kan. 2008); Fields v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 375, 411
(Ky. 2008); State v. Lee, 645 N.W.2d 459, 468 (Minn. 2002); State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 134
(N.J. 1991); State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609, 653 (N.C. 2002); State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 639
(Ohio 2006); Stouffer v. State, 147 P.3d 245, 268 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003); Prible v. State, 175
S.W.3d 724, 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); State v. Calliham, 57 P.3d 220, 231 (Utah 2002).
269. In this sense, the use of an IVE instead of a live scene viewing would be analogous to
redacting the gory details from photographs depicting the scenes of crimes or accidents, autopsies,
and so on. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 43–44 (1st Cir. 2007).
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defendant‘s mistake was reasonable, the defendant, as a practical matter,
would have to take the stand and testify to her recollection and perception of
the events for the jury to see the alley through her eyes, placing her credibility
at issue and subjecting herself to all of the inherent risks of testimony—being
under oath, subject to cross-examination;270 opening the door to the
introduction of highly prejudicial information, like evidence of her prior bad
acts, convictions, and inconsistent statements,271 or evidence that is otherwise
inadmissible;272 or undercutting the jury‘s ability to apply the presumption of
innocence and burden of proof.273 With an IVE, a VR expert could generate
an IVE, taking into account all parties‘ versions of events, permitting the jury
to see the alley through the defendant‘s eyes without the inherent risks
entailed with the waiver of her Fifth Amendment privilege through live

270. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 868–69 (2008) (discussing the
value of hearing from the defendant and the way that a criminal defendant‘s decision to testify
exposes her to cross-examination with otherwise inadmissible evidence—―a vigorous rhetorical
challenge to any perceived inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the defendant‘s testimony‖).
271. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (prohibiting the introduction of evidence of a defendant‘s prior
bad acts to prove action in conformity therewith); FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (permitting impeachment of
a testifying witness with evidence of prior bad acts); FED. R. EVID 609 (permitting impeachment of a
testifying witness with evidence of prior convictions); FED. R. EVID 613 (permitting impeachment of
a testifying witness with evidence of prior inconsistent statements); see generally FED. R. EVID. 609
advisory committee‘s notes (―[I]n virtually every case in which prior convictions are used to impeach
the testifying defendant, the defendant faces a unique risk of prejudice—i.e., the danger that
convictions that would be excluded under FED. R. EVID 404 will be misused by a jury as propensity
evidence despite their introduction solely for impeachment purposes.‖); Margaret Meriwether
Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 495, 508 (1995) (―The danger that the jury will misuse evidence of a defendant‘s prior record
is a real one, and the prejudice arising from misuse is substantial.‖); Alan D. Hornstein, Between
Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (1997) (―Typically, the defendant may keep the jury from learning of prior convictions
only by waiving the right to testify.‖); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 419 (1980) (noting the impossibility of a jury separating
character evidence introduced to impeach a defendant‘s credibility from its knowledge of the
defendant‘s character as applied to the determination of guilt or innocence). But see FED. R. EVID.
806 (permitting the impeachment of the credibility of a nontestifying hearsay declarant in the manner
as if the declarant had testified).
272. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990) (permitting a testifying criminal
defendant to be impeached with evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980) (permitting a testifying criminal
defendant to be impeached with evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even if the
defendant‘s direct-examination testimony did not implicate the illegally seized evidence, as long as
the subject was ―reasonably suggested by the defendant‘s direct examination‖); Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 721–22 (1975) (permitting a testifying criminal defendant to be impeached with evidence
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
273. Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment
to the Innocent One, 78 GEO. L.J. 1, 19 (1989).
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testimony.274 Presumably, this is precisely what the defense in Harris was
attempting to do with its rejected VR simulation—show the jury what the
parking lot looked like from behind the wheel of the Mercedes in a more
reliable and less risky way than having Harris testify about what she saw.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In any given trial, there may be legitimate concerns about the reliability
and accuracy of employing an IVE to reconstruct the scene of an accident or
crime. Some of the essential questions educed by the baseline assumptions
underlying the creation and interpretation of IVEs recommend a cautious
strategy to their use during jury trials. Assuming, however, that foundational
testimony satisfied the ordinary standards for admissibility, the law should not
react to the challenges raised by the use of IVEs with juries by categorically
excluding them. Instead, courts should allow the use of IVEs (in appropriate
cases) while endeavoring to improve jurors‘ virtual literacy so that their
findings of fact and legal judgments will be facilitated by the best available
computer technology.
Concerns with distortion and manipulation are not unique to IVEs. Still
photographs can be doctored in ways that render the changes undetectable.
These types of concerns with IVE models could be addressed through
thorough pretrial discovery, particularly of the bases for the construction of
the model, under the existing rules of criminal and civil procedure.275 Some
concerns could also be addressed with limiting instructions to the jury,276
including instructions as to weight that the jury should place on its
observations within an IVE. If the different sources of information upon
which an IVE model is built are questionable or unreliable, those unreliable
sources could be explored by the opponent of the IVE model on crossexamination or even, ultimately, become grounds to challenge the use of an
individual IVE model in a particular case,277 but such concerns do not warrant

274. One non-courtroom example of the possibilities for using VR technology to develop more
accurate understandings of past events is the VR simulation ―JFK: Reloaded,‖ which uses IVE
technology to place participants in the role of Lee Harvey Oswald, John F. Kennedy, Jr.‘s assassin, in
a mass-participation forensic reconstruction of the events to determine whether Lee Harvey Oswald
could have acted alone. Had such technology been available in 1963, Oswald‘s defense team could
have deployed it to advance an alternate theory of the crime.
275. Presumably, an IVE model of crime or accident scene would be constructed primarily
with reference to video and photographic recordings, witness statements, and physical evidence.
276. See, e.g., Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 225 P.2d 497, 502 (Cal. 1950) (holding that permitting
a jury to view the scene of an accident on a hotel roof after substantial changes had been made was
not error because the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the changes in reaching its
verdict).
277. For example, if an expert computer witness constructed an IVE model, at least in part, on
the basis of partisan witness statements, and if changing the contents of the witness statements would
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excluding an entire medium from jury trials. Certainly, if a particular IVE
model would be of little assistance to a jury and its potential for misuse, delay,
or confusion of the issues were great or it were cumulative of other evidence
presented, a court would have the discretion to deny its admission under Rule
403.
While the use of an IVE during a jury trial may seem like a foreign
invasion into the traditional American adversary judicial system, it can also be
viewed as merely another point along a line of technological progression,
from scene viewing to photography to video evidence to virtual evidence.
Employing an IVE during trial would be no different in substance than the
admission of other types of testimonial, photographic, and demonstrative
evidence that courts have permitted for decades. Many of the concerns with
the use of an IVE during a jury trial (distortion, reliability, authenticity) are
the same concerns that were raised when photographic (and later video)
evidence of crime and accident scenes first began to be introduced during jury
trials. Ultimately, those objections were overcome by comparing and
analogizing the photographic evidence to the more traditional practice of the
jury viewing the scene. Today, no one doubts the admissibility of a crime
scene photograph or video, as long as it is a fair and accurate representation of
the scene that it seeks to capture. On the contrary, contemporaneous
photographs and videos are often admitted into evidence as more accurate
alternatives to a visit to the (subsequently altered) scene by the jury. In the
same vein, IVE technology used to re-create a scene is simply an even more
advanced and accurate way of helping the jury to weigh and evaluate witness
testimony and other evidence. As such, the advantages of its use far exceed
the disadvantages.
Much has been written about the epistemic underpinnings of the rules of
evidence—to wit, that the central function of a trial is to discover the truth and
that accuracy is a measure of the proximity to or likelihood of the truth.278
change the resulting model in a way that benefited the opposing party, such information would
certainly affect the weight that the jury would give to the model and the expert‘s opinion about it.
This process would be no different than if a psychiatrist retained by a party in a civil or criminal case
gave an expert psychiatric opinion on the basis of information provided directly by the party and an
assumption that such information was accurate and truthful.
278. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (noting that the
―basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth‖); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381
(1933) (―The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest—if they are to rest upon
reason—is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.‖); R. v. Nikolovski, [1996]
3 S.C.R. 1197, 1206 (Can.) (stating that ascertaining the truth is ―[t]he ultimate aim of any trial,
criminal or civil‖); R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, 483 (Can.) (stating that ―[t]he goal of the
court process is truth seeking‖); R. v. Howard, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1337, 1360 (Can.) (emphasizing ―the
commitment of courts of justice to the ascertainment of the truth‖); ERNEST GELLNER,
LEGITIMATION OF BELIEF 27 (1974); H.L. HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE
SEARCH FOR TRUTH 63 (2008); LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY
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They are why the rules of evidence entertain a strong presumption in favor of
the admissibility of relevant evidence.279 Periodically, the development of a
new technology forces the judicial system to rethink those epistemological
questions.280
Much more than traditional modes of visual media, IVEs have the power
to place jurors in the position of the parties and witnesses to the circumstances
surrounding a disputed event.281 At the same time, the use of IVEs would
permit courts to ―lock in‖ the scene at the relevant moment in time and
remove any unfairly prejudicial items from the jury‘s perception. Subject to

LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 2 (2006); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 184–85 (1948) (suggesting that the court should
attempt to get ―as close an approximation of the truth as is possible‖); Frederick Schauer, On the
Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 194 (2006); Alex Stein,
Against “Free Proof,” 31 ISR. L. REV. 573, 576–77 (1997); Alex Stein, The Refoundation of
Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 279, 285 (1996); William Twining, Freedom of Proof
and the Reform of Criminal Evidence, 31 ISR. L. REV. 439, 452 (1997); Wendorf, supra note 40, at
387 (―[J]ustice and fairness to litigants insist that jurors be permitted to see the issues for themselves
when circumstances make that action feasible.‖). But see LUDOVIC KENNEDY, THE TRIAL OF
STEPHEN WARD 251 (1965) (―[L]et no one pretend that our system of justice is a search for truth. It
is nothing of the kind. It is a contest between two sides played according to certain rules, and if the
truth happens to emerge as the result of the contest, then that is pure windfall.‖); HENRY SUMNER
MAINE, VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST 302 (New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1889)
(rejecting the theory that judicial evidence is ―a sort of contrivance for the discovery of truth‖);
FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN THE LAW 275 (1969) (arguing that it is ―the greatest of all the
fallacies . . . that the business of a court of justice is to discover the truth‖); JOHN W. SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW 458 (1907) (arguing that that the rules of evidence are
one of the ―last refuges of legal formalism‖); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., A Treatise on the AngloAmerican System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 513, 519 (1924) (book
review); Edmund M. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 285, 285 (1943) (rejecting the characterization of a lawsuit as
―primarily a proceeding for the discovery of truth‖); Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and
Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding, 18 L. & PHIL. 497, 506 (1999) (characterizing the
judicial proceeding ―less as a search for substantive truth than as a search for a definite winner‖);
Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth? A German Perspective, 26 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL.‘Y 157, 167 (2003) (arguing that ―the jury is not designed to function as a truth-finder‖
because jurors are irrational).
Other commentators argue that the central objectives of the rules of evidence are legitimacy,
fairness, and integrity. See, e.g., H. L. Ho, Legal Professional Privilege and the Integrity of Legal
Representation, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 163, 168–69 (2006); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in
Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L REV. 223, 241 (1966).
279. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402; CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (1995); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 60-407 (West 2010). One exception to this claim is the rationale behind evidentiary rules
that purport to exclude evidence on grounds of unreliability. See HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE
LAW, supra note 278, at 63.
280. See PAUL, supra note 15, at 34 (―Digital information objects now compel us to rediscover
the concept of authenticity.‖); id. at 48 (―The drafters of Article X [of the Federal Rules of Evidence]
gave no thought to the fact that digital files are pure information, and live apart from the world of
artifacts. . . .‖).
281. See Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 265–66.
IN
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reasonable limitations and the ability of a proponent to establish the necessary
foundation for admissibility, the interests of truth are advanced by allowing
the parties, or even the court, to employ an IVE during a jury trial.

